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Abstract  
Coinciding with the transition to democracy in Mexico (and elsewhere in Latin 
America), violent crime increased substantially and joined with the citizenry’s 
concerns about corruption. The overarching question of the research can be 
summarized as: How and how much do perceptions and experiences with crime 
and corruption impact democracy? In its most general conception the thesis is 
that in Mexico, an increasingly adverse context (experience + perceptions) of 
crime and corruption has a negative and significant impact on social capital. This 
discussion can be viewed as a partial assessment of the quality and strength of 
democracy in Mexico. The topic is of relevance because the magnitude of crime 
and corruption in Mexico suggest that they have become ‘regularized patterns of 
interaction’. 
 
Social capital is viewed as a two-dimension/three-components concept that can 
be measure by adding the stocks of its components: trust, reciprocity and 
participation.  This dependent variable, as well as its determinants, is measured 
Pablo Gerardo Parás Garcia – University of Connecticut 2013 
 
integrally and in depth using ad-hoc public opinion survey research. Analysis of 
two different groups is contrasted using confirmatory factor analysis to validate 
measurements and structural equation models to test causal relations between 
variables. The general model of interaction and causality between variables is 
confirmed by the data.  
 
The principal finding is that crime/corruption have direct and indirect effects of 
both the cognitive and structural dimensions of social capital as well as on 
human capital and other democratic attitudes. Individuals that have been victims 
of crime/corruption or those who have greater perceptions of the magnitude of 
these problems, live with greater fear, are less likely to trust individuals or 
institutions, to cooperate with others and to participate in formal/informal social 
organizations. Additionally they report lower levels of personal health and lower 
satisfaction with democracy. The research provides evidence of the negative 
impact that crime/corruption have on democracy and development. 
 
The relation between variables is tested using alternate data (an hemispheric 
wide survey) and method of analysis (linear regressions). Some results are 
confirmed but others are contradictory and it is argued that the main reason is 
the difference in measurement and method. 
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Chapter I: The Power of Perceptions 
 
All our knowledge is the offspring of our perceptions. 
Leonardo da Vinci, Thoughts on Art and Life 
 
 
We see people and things not as they are, but as we are 
Anthony de Mello 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Transition to democracy in Mexico has been a slow and steady process 
that began in the late sixties1.  The 2000 presidential elections that brought 
alternation in the presidency constitute a political inflection point: after seven 
decades of a one party system, a president from the opposition came to power.  
This historical event can be considered as the end of a three-decade gradual 
transition to democracy and the beginning of a democratic consolidation phase.  
Electoral institutions and a growing participation from civic society played a 
central role in the transition. To advance toward consolidation, however, 
additional institutional, structural and cultural changes need to take hold.  In this 
new scholarly agenda on quality of democracy, a central problem merits priority: 
coinciding with the transition to democracy in Mexico (and elsewhere in Latin 
America), violent crime increased substantially and joined with the citizenry’s 
concerns about corruption.   
How and how much do perceptions and experiences with crime and corruption 
impact democracy? This is the overarching question of the research.  To address 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Dominguez and McCann (1996) and Dominguez and Poiré (1999). 
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it, the work focuses mainly on values, perceptions, opinions and behavior of the 
general public --both at the aggregate and individual level of analysis-- and these 
are viewed as instrumental aspects for democracy.  Direct and indirect 
experiences as well as received information that individuals interpret as their 
reality have a direct impact on their attitudes and behavior. This constitutes the 
power of perceptions. 
 
1.2. Research thesis and hypothesis to be tested 
In its most general conception the thesis is that in Mexico, an increasingly 
adverse context (experience + perceptions) of crime and corruption has a 
negative and significant impact on social capital. The public’s perceptions of 
public safety and corruption are viewed as symptoms of the existence of these 
problems and I will argue that such perceptions have negative consequences for 
democracy.  To assess the consequences of these perceptions, my research 
explores with particular emphasis specific conditions that could adversely impact 
the consolidation of democracy. I expect to find a qualitative aspect to 
perceptions that is directly related to the experience of crime or corruption and 
has implication both at the individual and aggregate level.  At the individual level, 
experience and/or perception of these problems, be it by direct experience or by 
other sources of information should result in a higher tendency to modify 
attitudes and/or behavior (direct experience with crime determining fear for 
example).  At the aggregate, the sum of these effects over time could result in 
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diminishing capacity of the social system’s ability to prefer, practice or maintain 
democracy.   
Recent scholarly agenda on democracy in Latin America has revolved around 
three central questions that are closely related: how did it happen (transition), 
what is the outcome (state of democratic governance), and what are its chances 
(consolidation)?  My discussion is placed within the last two questions and 
should be viewed as a partial assessment of the quality and strength of 
democracy in Mexico.  I view democratization as an ongoing process: unfinished 
business that can and should be widened and deepened, and for which there 
exist the probability of an authoritarian regression.  The 2010 report from the 
Americas Barometer, the largest comparative survey in the hemisphere, explores 
the state of democracy and political culture in the context of what Freedom 
House has label as a “worldwide democratic recession”2. Results for Mexico of 
key democratic indicators in the 2010 round of the survey support the recession 
argument (Paras et. al. 2011) and the trend is confirmed by the latest 2012 
results (Paras and Vidal 2012). 
As shown in Figure 1.1 the general hypothesis is that perceptions and 
experience of crime and corruption have a negative effect on key democratic 
beliefs, feelings, and intended and real behavior. Specific relations between 
crime/corruption to key democratic indicators are explored in the research in 
order to unpack this general research question.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Information on this topic and evaluations on the quality of democracy can be found at: 
http://freedomhouse.eu/ 
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Figure 1.1: General research hypothesis of how  
democracy is being impacted by perceptions of crime and corruption 
 
 
 
The following are the specific hypotheses tested in the research: 
Individuals with high perceptions of crime and/or corruption are less likely 
to …  
 
a) Trust other individuals; 
b) Trust institutions; 
c) Reciprocate with their peers; 
d) Participate in formal and/or informal organizations; 
e) Report good personal health;  
f) Be satisfied with democracy and have democratic attitudes; 
 
… than individuals with low perceptions of crime and corruption. 
 
The hypotheses outlined above refer to the way I intend to explore the political 
cost of crime and corruption.  The first four are part of the scholarly agenda of the 
concept/theory of social capital (a to d) and human capital (e).  Additional political 
costs of crime and corruption are explored by measuring the impact on 
democratic attitudes and preferences (last hypothesis) and indirectly by 
assessing the quality of democracy from a social capital theory perspective.  
Taken all into account the research question driving the analysis can be 
PERCEPTIONS 
of Crime and 
Corruption 
DEMOCRATIC 
Preferences 
Attitudes and 
Behavior 
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rephrased to: How and to what degree is social capital (and democracy) in 
Mexico being impacted by crime and corruption? 
 
1.3. Perceptions, Social Capital, Crime and Corruption 
The concept and theory of social capital (SC) will be reviewed in depth in 
the second chapter.  Following is a brief general description of the concept that 
serves as an introduction. Social Capital has two dimensions.  The first is 
cognitive and it is best captured by the amount of trust an individual has of others 
(individuals or institutions).  The second is structural and refers to the amount of 
participation of an individual in formal and informal organizations.  These two 
dimensions are viewed in the literature both as indicators and determinants of the 
quality and strength of democracy.  The social capital argument can be summed 
up as follows: societies with high proportions of individuals that trust each other 
and actively participate in social organizations have stronger democracies.  This 
Tocquevillan view of the virtues of civic engagement is viewed here as crucial for 
Mexico due to its specific context (high crime and corruption) and specific 
moment (consolidation of democracy).  If indeed crime and corruption impact 
social capital, and if they are large, widespread and increasing problems, then 
the impact they have on the future of the quality of democracy in Mexico’s could 
be significant.    
A review of democracy in Latin America conducted by the United Nations 
Development Program provides among others the following conclusions: 
countries in the region need to advance from an electoral to a citizen democracy; 
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societal deficits constitute challenges for democracy; and growth cannot be 
achieved with out social cohesion (PNUD 2004).  I believe this to be true for 
Mexico and I will try to demonstrate that crime and corruption have important 
political consequences.  It is within this line of thought that researching the effect 
on democracy of these two social regrettables is of practical and theoretical 
importance. The data presented will also help to describe the magnitude of the 
crime/corruption problems and provide a partial assessment of stocks of social 
capital in Mexico.    
As it was mentioned above, my research is interested in the specific context of 
crime and corruption in Mexico and its impact on trust and cooperative behavior 
(i.e. participation). These two dimensions or constructs –trust and participation—
constitute my attitude objects. In other words: what feelings, beliefs and intended 
behavior result from interaction of an individual and his/her specific context 
regarding crime and corruption.  Adding to the experiences of individuals, the 
power of perceptions is twofold.  On one hand, and because it has a direct 
impact on what be feel, belief and do, it should be viewed as an important 
component of the research agenda in political and other social sciences.  
Research including perceptions could measure its determinants, its components 
and/or its impacts on attitudes.  On the other hand, and because perceptions are 
directly impacted by the context, it has a practical value as we can assess 
probable outcomes of changes in context. This could be important for the 
institutionalization of democracy in Mexico. O’Donnell defines institutions as a: 
“regularized pattern of interaction that is known, practiced, and accepted (if not 
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necessarily approved) by actors who expect to continue interacting under the 
rules sanctioned and backed by the pattern” (1994: 58).  Under such definition 
have crime and corruption become institutionalized in Mexico?  I will argue that 
they have.  The numbers that describe the state of crime and corruption in 
Mexico, presented later, do suggest that they have become ‘regularized patterns 
of interaction’.  For now let me just mentioned three international sources that 
reflect the seriousness and magnitude of the crime/corruption problems. 
Regarding crime, the latest Conflict Barometer published by the Heidelberg 
Institute for International Conflict Research categorized Mexico as a “war” zone 
in it’s High Intensity Violent Conflicts map of 20123. This is a clear indication that 
organized crime has been on the rise for the past years. Regarding corruption 
the Americas Barometer places Mexico in second place, just after Haiti, in its 
victimization by corruption indicator; and Transparency International gives 
Mexico a 3.2 grade on a its ten-point scale 2008 Corruption Perception Index4. 
Regularities in the context become reinforcing information for individuals, that 
over time become consistent perceptions that can strongly influence attitudes.  
The more stable a context of interaction the more reinforcing it becomes of 
feeling, beliefs and intended behavior. So, do most Mexicans face a real or 
perceived (to be real) context of high crime and corruption in their every day 
activities? The following chapters present enough information to conclude that 
they do; for now let me provide an example of what a typical weekday morning of 
an imaginary average resident of a large urban center in Mexico may be like. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The full report and map can be found in the Institute’s web site: http://www.hiik.de/en/index.html 
4 Results can be found on their respective web sites: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/  and 
http://www.transparency.org/ 
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purpose is to show the kind of information presented to and interpreted by 
individuals living in a context of high- crime, high-corruption. 
Let’s give her a name, Lupe Perez and let us assume that she is thirty four years 
old, married, mother of three, living in a small rented house in a medium-low 
income neighborhood in a southern demarcation of the city.  She is a hard-
working administrative assistant of a medium size company.  After making migas 
(scrambled eggs with chopped tortillas) for breakfast and leaving her youngest 
child with a next-door relative, Lupe takes her other kids to a nearby public 
school.  They have to take the orange line of the subway from Copilco to the 
Viveros station; from there is a short walk to the school.  After dropping her kids 
she takes a pesero (small public bus) to work.    She sits in the back of the bus 
holding her purse tightly between her legs.  She can’t help of being suspicious of 
some of the people sharing the ride.  In her mind she remembers the 
conversation with her sister the previous night about the increasing number of 
assaults.  She recalls her words: “I tell you querida, they strike everywhere now: 
in the subway, buses, in the street, even in the neighborhood; surely you 
watched the news. I don’t know, but these days you can’t trust anyone.”  She is 
horrified by the front-page news of a local newspaper held by a passenger to her 
right: “Eight more executions by the Templarios in Michoacan”. She turns to the 
window for a while trying to escape her memories.  She spots a police patrol 
blocking the left lane and a policemen discussing with an apparently upset driver.  
That’s going to end with a bribe, she thinks to herself as she speculates whether 
it is worse to ride the pesero or to own a car and face the morning traffic.  She 
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grabs her purse with all extremities in an instinct-like reaction when a young man 
sits besides her.  He smiles to her and adjust his earphones from a small MP3 
player.   She makes a quick assessment: he seems harmless.  She reaches her 
stop, gets down form the bus and walks quickly to the office building.  At her desk 
a colleague asks: “How was it manita?  You weren’t mugged today?” She moves 
her head from side to side as she sadly remembers the incident of seven months 
ago when two young men boarded the pesero and took as much as they could 
from what little the passengers had.  Most likely she will not be mugged again for 
along time, maybe never; however, it is very likely that she will continue to feel 
insecure, belief that there is danger in her every morning ride and behave 
distrustfully of others.  She lives with fear as her perceptions of danger and risk 
are slowly increasing and being constantly reinforced by the experience of 
others.  She has become distrustful and distant of others she did not mind in the 
past; she has turn inwards as she begins to avoid certain situations that might 
expose her to future dangers; she reinforces her feelings, beliefs and actions 
from information presented in the media and discussed with her close group of 
family and friends. 
 
Democracy faces a big challenge if many Mexicans, like our imaginary Lupe, 
react to a context of crime and corruption (perceived to be adverse for them) in 
ways that constraint social cohesion and cooperation.  If crime and corruption are 
perceived to be so widespread that they are norms rather than exceptions, 
maybe they have become internalized --maybe to the point of institutionalization-- 
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in the life of most individuals. But a context can be changed, and these changes 
can trigger or detonate new patterns of behavior, and in turn create democratic 
norms.   
Electoral participation in Mexico is a good example of how new regularities of a 
context can slowly help develop new attitudes and habits. Since the early 90´s 
the electoral reforms in Mexico have work in favor of new patterns of interaction 
within the electoral aspect of democracy in Mexico; a slow transition from an 
uncertain and unstable, to an efficient electoral context with real competition.5 
Probably the most salient change was the creation of the Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE for its Spanish acronym).6 The IFE has guarantee clean and fair 
elections since 1994. It has created a stable and regular electoral context 
recognized worldwide, but most important, trusted by the Mexican electorate. 
Surely the alternation in power at the level of the president of the year 2000 could 
not have been possible without the IFE.  Transiting to another party after seventy 
years of one party rule was possible by a clear definition and enforcement of the 
rules of the game with the IFE as the electoral watchdog.  It is until recent, that 
Mexican voters have experienced the meaning and value of their votes.  Before 
the electoral reforms existed and were successfully enforced, the perception of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Mexican voters had not experienced real electoral competition before the late 80’s.  In the 1988 
presidential election two strong opposition candidates challenged the status quo and “voters 
shocked the political establishment with their demand for fundamental political change”.  This was 
a decisive event for years to come, and it was probably a bitter, but temporary lesson for the 
electorate as the election “was marred by widespread and not unfound accusations of electoral 
fraud” (Dominguez 1999: 2). The system after all, was able to contain the shock.  Gradual change 
was ahead.  In 1989 the PRI lost for the first time a gubernatorial election since 1929.  By 1997 
the opposition had a majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies; controlled seven 
governorships (six ruled by the PAN and one, Mexico City, by the PRD); and most of the mayors 
of the largest cities were governed by the PAN (Dominguez 1999: 5-10). 
6 An excellent discussion of the electoral reforms can be found in Becerra, Salazar and 
Woldenberg 2005. 
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fraudulent election was the norm for the average Mexican.  The incentive to vote 
prior to the reform was low, in part because there was no organized opposition 
but also because voters perceived that their votes matter very little.  Creation of 
the IFE helped change such perceptions.  One of the most salient regularities of 
the electoral context before the reforms was the fact that electoral participation 
was in great part the result of political coercion.  Today, electoral participation in 
Mexico, a crucial behavioral aspect of any democracy, is the result of free will. 
 
1.4. The Power of Perceptions 
Our attitudes and behavior are directly and greatly influenced by our 
perceptions because they are determined by our interpretation of the world.   
Research in different disciplines explores the relation between perceptions and 
attitudes/behavior.  In Tanzania for example, the use of a condom of a sexually 
active teenager is determine in part by his perception of the like/dislike of the use 
condom during intercourse of his partner, and also by his belief of the condom as 
an effective prevention against HIV infection (Maswanya et al., 1999).  According 
to a study in Georgia USA, perceptions of food quality and food safety are 
determinants of food consumption habits (Rimal et al., 2001).  Text in the field of 
consumer behavior shows that sensations and perceptions play a key role when 
making a purchasing decision (Solomon et al., 1996).  Dutch motorists are asked 
about their perceptions of the quality of the environment and urban 
neighborhoods to assess alternative public policies (IVEM 2006). Perceptions 
between competitors are used as input for a repeated interaction rational choice 
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model to determine business actions in an oligopoly market (Marks 1998).  
Global-scale surveys that capture perceptions of business leaders on 
competitiveness (Economic World Forum) and corruption (Transparency 
International) determine in part future foreign direct investment decisions.  Crime 
surveys in England and Wales are use to determine the main perceptual 
predictors of perceptions of crime levels and worries about crime (Nicholas and 
Walker 2004). In psychology, perceptions are key components of influential 
theories on learning such as those of Bandura or Rotter.  This is just a short list 
of example of the large empirical research providing evidence on how 
perceptions play an important role in determining attitudes and behavior of 
individuals.   
The examples mentioned above reflect research agendas and priorities that 
respond to specific contextual characteristics, be that of the field of study or of 
the specific geography (time and place):  HIV transmission in Tanzania, food 
safety concerns in the United States, environment in the Netherlands, or 
oligopolies in economic theory.  In my case the research agenda is placed within 
the field of political science, survey research methodology, and social capital 
theory; but also defined by the specific characteristics and context of Mexico in 
the new millennium.  Crime and corruption were chosen because public opinion 
survey in Mexico shows they are perceived as widespread problems and 
because empirically it has been shown that they have a direct impact of support 
for and satisfaction with democracy7. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Both the Americas Barometer (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/) and the Latinobarometer 
(http://www.latinobarometro.org/), the two largest surveys in the hemisphere have documented 
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What are the differences between attitudes and perceptions? I take attitudes to 
be “relative lasting clusters of feelings, beliefs, and behavior tendencies directed 
toward specific persons, ideas, objects or groups” (Baron and Byrne 1984: 126).  
Definitions that include these three components are known in the literature as the 
ABC model of Attitudes: Affect (feelings), Behavior and Cognition (beliefs).  It is 
important to stress that under the concept of attitude, behavior refers to intention 
(i.e. verbal statements about intended behavior) rather than action (actual 
behavior).  The ABC’s are directly impacted by outside stimuli.  At the individual 
level, the relation between a person and outside stimuli is defined by his/her 
sensations and perceptions. Solomon defines sensations as “the immediate 
responses of our sensory receptors ... to such basic stimuli as light, color and 
sound [and perceptions as] the process by which these stimuli are selected, 
organized, and interpreted” (1996: 56).  I take perceptions to be the interpretation 
that results from the interaction of an individual with his/her context.  Under such 
definition, perceptions are taken as key determinants of feelings, beliefs and 
behaviors (i.e. attitudes).  In other words, to what we are exposed to and how we 
make sense of the selected information that results from that exposure, 
determines to some degree, the components of the ABC model of attitudes.  
Spooncer (1992) represents the components of attitude in a triangle impacted by 
outside stimuli; such conceptualization is useful because it depicts the type of 
information we obtain when measuring attitudes using survey research.  His 
research suggest that when we intent to capture attitudes --through the use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and supported this claim in their respective series of surveys. Both series of surveys are public 
and can be consulted in the mentioned websites.  
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structured interviews as the one used in public opinion surveys-- we measure 
some/all of its components (see Figure 1.2).  In other words we measure: ‘verbal 
statements of feelings’, ‘verbal statements of beliefs’ and ‘verbal statements 
about intended behavior’. We can also assume that when we use survey 
research to capture feelings, beliefs, and intended behavior, we are indirectly and 
partially measuring the result of the specific interaction and interpretation of the 
world by the individual; hence context and perceptions.  After time and as a 
function of input (i.e. experience with context) and processing of information 
(perceptions), the individual develops somewhat coherent and stable attitudes, 
that in turn impact the way we interpret new or repeated input, and that also 
impacts the way we respond to specific situations.  This process is graphically 
presented in Figure 1.2 as an adaptation of Spooncer’s components of attitudes 
diagram.  The differences with the original diagram are that stimuli are presented 
as a two-part process, and that it shows a feedback loop between attitudes and 
perceptions, suggesting mutual interaction. 
The diagram depicts a funnel in which first an individual is exposed to a context 
that produces information; secondly, interprets it by processing selected 
information (perceptions); and finally the result of such interpretation impacts our 
attitudes (ABC’s), opinions and preferences. The diagram suggests that an 
attitude, once developed by the individual, can have an impact on how we select 
and interpret future information8.  Attitudes can also be partial determinant of 
actual behavior.  Berlo’s model of the formation of habit strength (FHS) looks at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Values are not included in the diagram but they can be viewed as deeper, more stable and long 
lasting than attitudes.  According to Salomon “a value is a belief that some condition is preferable 
to its opposite. (1996: 142) 
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how the interpretation of information impacts responses, in other word behavior 
(1960, Cultsock).  Such responses can be either viewed as a fourth step in the 
diagram or as an alternative third step as suggested by Berlo’s.  A final step in 
the FHS model is the evaluation of responses made by the individual.  When 
actions are assessed, either as bringing reward or punishment and producing 
some sort of reinforcement (positive or negative) they impact future behavior 
(habit formation). 
 
Figure 1.2: Formation of attitudes 
 
Source: Adapted from Spooncer (1992) 
 
 
An additional ingredient that needs to be considered is the effect of social 
interactions; after all, individuals do not live in a social vacuum.  The social 
learning theory developed by Rotter (1954), states that direct experience is not a 
(3) Attitudes 
Cognition 
Behavior 
Affect 
(1) Information        -----             (2) Interpretation      -----                    	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necessary condition for knowledge.  Downs’ (1957) also discusses the role 
others play as informational shortcuts in the discussion of the rationality of public 
opinion. The impact of social interactions is probably best captured by 
Chomsky’s (1988) poverty of stimulus argument: “There would not be enough 
time for us to experience enough to learn everything we know, so we learn much 
from observing the effects of other people’s experiences.”.  It follows that we can 
learn about crime or corruption from what we perceive of the experience of 
others (i.e. indirect experiences and third-party information) and in turn develop 
attitudes toward these problems even of we are not direct victims of them.  Thus, 
learning is in part determined by our perceptions of our own experiences as well 
as the experiences of others.  After all and as Dennet (1995) reminds us we are 
Skinnerian, Darwinian and Popperian creatures, in other words: biology, 
environment and reason.  
To sum up we have a process where a context (including observation of and 
information form others) produces information that is selected and processed by 
the individual.  Perception is the result of this interaction and has a direct impact 
on attitude formation and on behavior (directly and indirectly through attitudes).  
Finally attitudes and evaluation of responses, create a feedback loop that 
impacts the way an individual interprets and reacts to future contexts and 
information, where most likely an individual will favor those actions that s/he 
evaluates as having positive consequences. 
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1.5. General overview of the dissertation and the research design 
Considering the way perceptions impact attitudes, and that they are 
determined by the specific context in which these perceptions and attitudes are 
found, it becomes crucial that I cover three things. The first one refers to the 
context of crime and corruption as I need to show that they have significantly 
permeated everyday life of Mexicans.  By describing such context, I will be able 
to view them and evaluate them as important components of the information 
received and processed by individuals and assess their consequences on 
perceptions and attitudes.  The second thing I intent to accomplish is to show 
that this input/context has a direct and negative effect on specific democratic 
beliefs, feelings and behaviors.  As it was mentioned above, assessing the 
impact of crime/corruption on the cognitive and structural components of social 
capital and other relevant democratic attitudes will partially do this. Finally, I will 
discuss how social capital is relevant for democratic performance, democratic 
chances and economic development in Mexico.   
Before discussing the research design and giving a brief overview of the thesis, I 
provide definitions of the key concepts that drive the analysis and have not yet 
been defined.  My intention is to frame for the reader the perspective that guides 
the basic components of my research: literature review, treatment and analysis of 
secondary data, methodological design, and interpretation of the results.  The 
most relevant concepts to be used throughout out the thesis are: perceptions, 
attitudes, institutions, public opinion, trust and social capital.  The first three have 
been discussed.  The aggregate measure of a representative sample of 
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individuals will be used here as the definition of public opinion.  This one vote-
one count operationalisation can be described as a simple sum of individual’s 
responses.  However as it was pointed out in the discussion above, we should 
acknowledge that survey answers reflect and/or measures perceptions 
(interaction with context and processing of information), attitudes and behavior. 
Trust will be used as “the state of readiness for unguarded interaction with 
someone or something” (Tway 1994, 8).  Finally, Social Capital is defined initially 
here as the “norms and values that permit cooperative behavior on the part of 
groups” (Fukuyama 1997) and of “any aspect of informal [or formal] social 
organization that constitutes a productive resource for one or more actors.” 
(Coleman 1994: 170). All of these, as well as the other relevant concepts of the 
research, such as quality of democracy, crime and corruption, will be discuss in 
grater depth in the next chapter. 
 
This introduction has provided a general description of the research by stating 
the purpose of my inquiry and my intended analytical perspective.  The logic of 
how perceptions are formed and impact attitudes and behavior has been 
discussed also.  The following paragraphs provide further details of the specifics 
of my research design by using the language of inference.  To test the six 
hypothesis outlined above, the social systems under study are Mexico City and 
the state of Guanajauto.  While the former constitutes a high-crime, high-
corruption context, the later represents the opposite.  The inclusion and analysis 
of these two different social systems is a useful control mechanism that allows 
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me to compare and discuss the findings and their implications in greater depth.  
The comparison across social systems will contrast its individuals to test if 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviors are independent of context or not.  My level 
of analysis is set at the individual differences.  I am interested to describe, 
explain (and prescribe if possible) how the impact of perceptions are determined 
by the characteristics of individuals.   
A detailed discussion on the operationalisation of variables and the statistical 
analysis is included in chapter three and documented in the annexes.  For this 
introduction let me just mention that because my goal is to explore the complexity 
of the issue at hand, Structural Equation Model (SEM) is used as the main 
statistical model of analysis.  In SEM a variable can be impacted by one or many 
variables (dependent) but it can also impact others (independent).  Thus, SEM 
captures direct and indirect (trough other variables) impacts, and depicts a 
multiple interaction relation between variables.  The measurement model 
presented, that is the causal relation between variables, is set according to the 
theory presented in chapter two.  Because the relevant concepts to my analysis 
can be of complex nature, most of them are measured using two or more items 
(variables). From here on, such multi-item measurement of concepts will be 
referred to as constructs.  The validity and reliability of each construct will be 
assessed using confirmatory factor analysis.  
In great part, my research design is concerned about the quality of measurement 
and that is why I use items that are behavioral referents of specific situations to 
capture the constructs that interest me.  A component of the third chapter is the 
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discussion and assessment of the quality of measurement of available data or 
proposed variables.  The variables/constructs included in the SEM can be 
grouped into: demographics, determinants of perception, components of 
perceptions of the crime/corruption problems, components of social capital 
(cognitive and structural), components of human capital, and democratic 
preferences.  The most relevant causal relation for my thesis is the impact of the 
components of perceptions of the problems of crime/corruption on the 
components of social capital; however the full model allows me to place my 
research in a larger context and assess the interaction of other relevant 
variables. 
I will be using two main types of data.  The first constitutes the set of available 
secondary data dealing with the topics relevant to my inquiry.  Such bank of 
information will be used mainly to describe the ‘state of the art’ of corruption, 
crime, social capital and democracy in Mexico from the public’s view. Such data 
from other surveys is used to complements and contextualized the findings and it 
includes among others the national victimizations surveys conducted by the 
ICESI and INEGI; national surveys of corruption and good government 
conducted by the local chapter of Transparency International; the Americas 
Barometer, an hemisphere-wide survey of political culture conducted by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project of the University of Vanderbilt; the World Values 
Survey conducted by the University of Michigan; and several other relevant 
sources. The data used for the SEM and test the proposed research hypothesis 
presented above, and to contrast the two social systems under comparison here, 
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is an ad-hoc survey specifically designed for this purpose. The surveys in Mexico 
City and Guanajuato were conducted and sponsored by a Mexican private 
consulting firm.  My intention is to go beyond the scattered research that has 
been done using public opinion surveys to compare differences between 
individuals according to their personal experience with and perceptions of crime 
and corruption. To my knowledge there aren’t any surveys available that allow 
this comparison, and include measurement of key social concepts (constructs) 
like the ones under study here.  
I do not intent to solve the complete and complex puzzle of how crime and 
corruption impact social capital and democracy. My main task is to provide 
evidence of the presence and magnitude of the political cost of crime and 
corruption under study here. To do so I will be interested in determining the 
significance and magnitude of the effect size.  The limitations and scope of the 
research --be it by methodological approach or by research design—as well as 
comparison to finding in the field, will be discussed in the appropriate sections. 
The next chapter provides an in depth literature review of the main topics of 
interest. These include: the origins and definitions of social capital, its relation to 
democratic attitudes, the link between crime/corruption and social capital, 
measurement of social capital and the stocks of social capital in Mexico. This 
chapter provides the conceptual framework for my research, placing it within a 
specific area of the political science literature, and discusses its relevance. It also 
presents the expected findings of the research. The third chapter is a detail 
discussion of the research design and its focus is on how to study the relation 
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between crime/corruption and social capital and democracy. Included here is the 
description of the data, the operationalisation and validation of the key 
measurement constructs, the general measurement model and a discussion of 
alternative measurements of social capital. In the fourth chapter I discuss the 
main results of the research in three sections: (a) does the data support the 
measurement model and confirms the hypothesis; (b) the magnitude and 
direction of the effect of crime/corruption on social capital; and (c) additional 
findings of the impact on key democratic constructs. In the final chapter the 
results of the analysis are put into context by showing the magnitude of crime 
and corruption in Mexico in recent years, by showing additional hemispheric data 
to discuss if the results can be generalize and to provide a prospective 
discussion of the future stocks of social capital in Mexico. In the last section of 
this chapter we conclude by providing a synthesis of the main findings. 
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Chapter 2: The Power of Social Capital 
 
"The new currency won't be intellectual capital. It will be social capital -the 
collective value of whom we know and what we'll do for each other. When social 
connections are strong and numerous, there is more trust, reciprocity, information 
flow, collective action, happiness, and, by the way, greater wealth." 	  
James Kouzes, Chairman Emeritus of Tom Peters Company. 	  	  
2.1 What is social capital? 
A relative new comer to the social sciences, the concept of social capital 
has gained popularity and momentum.  This has generated a substantial amount 
of scholarly research dealing with the subject; however we are yet to reach a 
clear understanding of what it is, how it operates, how it is created and what are 
its outcomes.   The chapter is guided by these four general questions and has 
two main objectives: to frame my theoretical and methodological approach; and 
to introduce the link between crime, corruption, social capital, and democracy.  
While the former defines the focus and scope of my research, the later justifies 
its theoretical significance. 
As I will show, the use of the concept has been the focus of recent research in 
multiple fields of study, addressing a wide variety of topics, relying on different 
methodological approaches at different levels of unit of analysis.  Social capital 
has been treated as a dependent as well as an independent variable (Coleman 
1994, Brehm and Rahn 1997, Seligson 2005, Paras 2007); in the earlier literature 
it had been studied in the developed world (Putnam 1993, Brehm and Rahn 
1997, Minkoff 1997, Newton 1997, Stolle and Hooghe 1998, Paxton 1999) with a 
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growing literature that focuses on the developing world (Narayan and Pritchet 
1999, Grootaert 1999, Krishna and Uphoff 1999, Krishna 2002) and in few cases 
as a multi-country endeavor (Knack and Keefer 1997, Stolle and Rochon 1998, 
Seligson 2005,)9. The words of Paldam serve to illustrate the apparent expansion 
and explosion of social capital: “One of the main virtues of social capital is that it 
is close to becoming a joint concept for all social science.” (2000: 631)  Whether 
that should be view as a virtue or a weakness is debatable.   
In addition to this introduction, the present chapter is organized into eight 
sections.  The first one is a general review of the concept of social capital that 
includes the concept’s origin, the most influential definitions found in the 
literature, the apparent consensus around the main components of the concept 
and a discussion of its power and weaknesses (i.e. its dark side). The second 
section defines the scope of my research as it lays out my approach and use of 
the concept. The third is an in-depth discussion of the power of trust, which will 
be presented as a key component of social capital. The following sections deal 
with two important topics: why is social capital important to the quality and 
strength of democracy, and what is its conceptual and causal link to crime and 
corruption.  The next section is a general discussion on how to measure social 
capital, and the next to last provides some general indicators of social capital in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Social Capital Gateway: Resources for the Study of Social Capital provides a good 
example of the rapid growth of this field of study. It is an internet page that shows the most 
important resources on the topic including books, journals, dissertations, digital libraries, web 
sites, directory of researchers, research by geography, career, courses and conferences.  It 
divides its huge electronic reading list in six different topics and many subtopics.  This Internet 
site (www.socialcapitalgateway.org) is edited by Fabio Sabatini of Sapienza University of Rome. 
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Mexico. On the final section I conclude the chapter and present a brief 
description of the expected findings of my research.  
	  
2.2 The Concept of Social Capital 
 
2.2.1 Origins and seminal authors 
Although its origins can be traced back to earlier theorist such as de 
Tocqueville, Durkheim or Weber (Healy and Sylvain 2001); Bourdieu, Coleman 
and Putnam “have generally been credited with introducing it to the theoretical 
debate” (Baron, Field and Schuller 2000: 1).  From a Marxist perspective, 
Bourdieu has a normative conception and views it as an exclusive asset of the 
privileged. Coleman (1988) uses a game-theory approach and is mainly 
interested in the concept as a determinant of human capital. Putnam provides a 
path dependent explanation of social capital and is responsible for the recent 
popularity of the concept by providing robust evidence of the declining stocks of 
social capital in the United States in his widely read book Bowling Alone10.  In the 
seminal work of these three authors, social capital is understood as a resource to 
collective action that produces different —and mostly positive— outcomes (Stone 
2001: 4). 
I believe that social capital has gained theoretical relevance for two main 
reasons.  The first one is Coleman’s contribution of placing it as a link between 
explanations of individual action provided by apparent extremes theories of social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Field 200 for a comprehensive review of the authors. 
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norms and rational choice (Coleman 1994).  The key to his argument is that 
social capital helps to explain cooperative solutions between individuals.  As 
Field points out, where ‘mutually reinforcing relations’ exist, reciprocity and 
sanctions increase the likelihood of cooperative solution in game theory (Field 
2003). The idea of social capital is appealing because it places the emphasis at 
the micro level of individual interaction —departing from the macro-emphasis of 
classical writers—but at the same time it represents a reaction against the 
consequences of increased individualism (Field 2003: 7-8).  The second reason 
has to do with Putnam’s ability to raise a yellow flag on democracy by pressing 
the Tocquevillian button; in other words creating awareness of the decrease in 
civic engagement and its consequences for democratic regimes and the quality 
of democracy.  The findings of both authors can also be viewed as having far 
reaching effects.  While Coleman found a strong and positive effect on human 
capital, a key determinant of development, Putnam showed it importance on 
institutional and social performance.11  These two authors should be placed at 
the origins of the theory of social capital.  Bourdieu’s impact has been more 
limited but it should not be discarded completely, as it can be a helpful qualifier 
when discussing the allocation of the benefits of social capital trough an 
individuals network.12   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Putnam’s seminal work, “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy”, compares 
different regions of Italy according to their historical disposition towards cooperation.  He finds 
that the level of culture/values of trust and cooperation of each region determines the future 
performance of society and institutions. 
12 This refers in general terms on how an individual benefits from having a network of contacts. 
Comparatively speaking trust, reciprocity and participation have been ways of operationalisating 
the concept of social capital that have been used more frequently than the measurement of an 
individual’s “network”. 
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Coleman introduced the concept as a “particular kind of resource available to an 
actor” therefore qualifying it in the family of capitals. He defined it as “a variety of 
different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect 
of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors ... within the 
structure” (Coleman 1990: 98). Putnam is by far the most influential proponent of 
social capital, but unfortunately —and that is part of the conceptual shortcomings 
of the term—provides a general definition that has spawn in many directions.  
Putnam defines social capital as “connections among individuals –social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” 
(Putnam 2000: 19).  Coleman allows for all sorts of norms of behavior within all 
sorts of social organization (i.e. entities) to be part of the construct of social 
capital, however the literature focuses mainly on the components included in 
Putnam’s definition: two norms (trust and reciprocity) within forms of social 
organization (formal or informal) that produce cooperation.  Field (2003: 40) 
reminds us that these components have been of scholarly interest for a long 
time; however the specific contribution of social capital is to view them as 
resources.  The norms constitute the cognitive dimension of the concept and the 
networks the structural.  But even within the smaller scope of the two dimension-
three components definition, we find ourselves in open territory as each 
component presents a potentially complex object of analysis. This is why some of 
the critics of social capital argue that the concept has been stretch conceptually 
becoming diffuse or too general. The dimension and components of the concept 
will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
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Empirically trust and networks have been measured and analyzed in very 
different ways.  Quantitatively speaking, the theoretical and empirical focus of the 
social capital literature has addressed these two components far more than 
reciprocity.  This has maybe to due with the fact that in relative terms reciprocity 
is a harder concept to grasp and/or measure.  A significant part of the literature 
focuses exclusively on one of the three components and the robustness of 
empirical evidence varies greatly across authors.  All of this has produced a 
growing body of loosely connected findings about specific aspects of the 
components of social capital and their impact on diverse (and again loosely-
related) variables.  To use the language of Kuhn, we could consider that we find 
ourselves in the early stage of social capital’s route to normal science.  Hayes 
suggests this in an article that presents eight specific criticisms13 about social 
capital: “is not an original concept, but rather a rebranding of a loose collection of 
themes related to trust and group participation from social psychology, sociology 
and economics – it isn’t a theory” (2009, 8). There is however, a great deal of 
convergence around two findings that will be discuss later in this chapter: (a) 
trust is a powerful predictor of behavior (both positive and negative) and 
institutional performance; and (b) the presence and quantity of trust and networks 
are associated with well-being.  To me these two findings can be taken as the 
main building blocks of knowledge in the field of social capital. Putnam pointed 
us in the right direction by rediscovering the importance of trust and social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The eight criticisms are: a concept based on a misleading metaphor, it isn’t social, it isn’t a 
theory, is tautological, it is difficult to show which direction causality originated, it is impossible to 
measure, has a dark side and is difficult to operationalise. All of these are address to some 
degree in the dissertation. 
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interactions. The next section presents additional conceptualizations of social 
capital by discussing the work of additional authors.  
 
2.2.2. Other influential definitions of social capital 
In order to deal with the problems of a loosely defined and an all-inclusive 
subject of analysis, authors have come up with definitions of social capital that 
are tailored to their specific and narrow inquiries.  This is perfectly fine, but it has 
not necessarily contributed to our understanding of the subject nor has produce 
plausible generalizations that can be tested and replicated in different settings.  
The work of Krishna (2002) is a good source to find the alternate definitions and 
measurements of the term. Her work shows how social capital has taken many 
different forms, from quality of associational life (Narayan and Pritchet 1999) to 
values that govern interaction (Grootaert 1998), or collective efficacy (Sampson 
et al. 1997).  The outcome of social capital is also of great variety in scholarly 
research: confidence in political institutions (Brehm and Rahn 1997), per capita 
household expenditure (Grootaert 1998), neighborhood violence (Sampson et al. 
1997) or poverty (Morris 1998) are a few examples to illustrate the point. 
The World Bank has been an important promoter of knowledge generation on the 
topic.  Its interest appears to have spawned from the potentially beneficial impact 
that social capital has on development.  Grootaert and Bastelaer, salient authors 
of the bank’s Social Capital Initiative, clearly identify the two dimensions of social 
capital in their definition; however in line with Coleman, the cognitive aspects are 
not limited to trust and reciprocity.  They define social capital as: “institutions, 
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relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions among people and 
contribute to economic and social development” (2002: 3-4).  While they are 
straight forward in regards to their interest in outcome (i.e. development) their 
definition could be classified as indefinite.  Such vague conceptualization begs 
the question of clarification: which relations, which attitudes and which values?  
While we may find that several attitudes beyond trust and reciprocity do have a 
significant impact on interactions between individuals, it is desirable to set a limit 
on the scope of the cognitive aspect of social capital.  However, what is crucial 
about Grootaert and Bastelaer definition is their clarification that the dimensions 
of social capital should be understood as a (partial) determinant of social 
relations and its outcomes.   
Stone also provides a general definition of the concept but an important and 
useful one because it provides a minimum common denominator: “social capital 
can be understood as a resource to collective action, which may lead to a broad 
range of outcomes” (Stone 2001: 4, italics mine).  While the first part of this 
common denominator places the concept within the family of capitals (along with 
others such as financial, physical and human capital), the second qualifies it.  In 
other words, the concept needs to be treated as a kind of capital, and its 
existence can have a wide variety of consequences.  These two facts have led to 
at least two important debates.  Borrowing from Krishna, the first debate can be 
called the detonation of social capital, which revolves around a key question: Are 
the three components of the concept a necessary condition for social capital to 
exist? The second debate is what has been called in the literature the ‘Dark Side’ 
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of social capital.  The first debate is addressed in the following lines and the 
second discussed at the end of this section.  
Whether I put it them to use or not, my knowledge –a crucial component of 
human capital-- or my monetary assets are worth something.  The same should 
be said of social capital.  I understand this to be the resource component in 
Stone’s ‘resource to action’ conceptualization.  The second part of the equation, 
the action, is more complicated. Several authors seem to place the emphasis or 
existence of social capital exclusively of the condition of being used, in other 
words when it is producing an outcome; Paxton, Putnam or Grootaert for 
example.  Others like Krishna suggest that social capital can have a latent state 
and that some detonation (i.e. agency) is needed for it to become productive.  
According to Paxton “When social capital is present, it increases the capacity for 
action and facilitates the production of some goods.  When active, it facilities 
various ends for the members of a group and for the group as a whole.  Social 
capital could, however, remain latent within the group and be viewed as potential 
energy.” (Paxton 1999: 93, my emphasis)  However she argues that the two 
components are a necessary condition for social capital to be productive and limit 
the existence of social capital to its productive state (Paxton 1999: 95). I disagree 
with this point of view, along with Krishna, Field and Paldam. For me social 
capital exists also in its latent (potentiality productive) state, when any of the 
components are present and even if the others are missing. Per se value is an 
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attribute of the family of capitals regardless of its use. The following are the 
additional characteristics of this family that apply to social capital14:  
• Productive: it can be used to produce other goods or services; 
• Result of labor: individual or group work generates it; 
• Result of savings: individuals set apart a part of their time or other 
resources to foster relations and create networks; 
• Accumulative: can be stocked; and 
• Finite: it is not constant or permanent. 
 
Arrow (1999) argues that three additional characteristics are implied in the term 
capital and that are not present in social capital: longevity (i.e. extension in time), 
deferred benefits in time and alienability. I agree with him on the last one but not 
on the first two; however one can make the case that the structural dimensions is 
indeed “referable” —and in this sense alienable—between individuals. It is 
important to mention here that some authors like Parts, consider that both human 
and social capital loose value when they are not in use (2010). This degradation 
could be considered as an additional characteristic not necessarily present in 
others types of capital. It is perhaps clearer if we understand social capital as a 
relational construct: “It can only provide access to resources where individuals 
have not only formed ties with others but have internalized the shared values of 
the group” (Field 2003: 139) 
In my view, the different components of social capital are precisely that –specific 
characteristics– and they do not need to be simultaneously present or in use to 
be counted as a stock or asset of an individual, a group of individuals or society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For more information see: Boldizzoni (2008) and Hennings (1987). 
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as a whole. Just like we can determine the financial wealth of a person by 
counting her/his portfolio of assets (e.g. properties, savings, investments, etc) we 
can also determine the wealth or stocks of social capital of an individual by 
determining her/his possessions of trust, reciprocity and networks. This view 
allows for social capital to be counted, another important quality of the family of 
capitals. “Social capital can be termed capital in so far as it gives rise to 
resources that can be deployed in order to enable actors – both individuals and 
groups – to pursue their goals more effectively than they could without it.” (Field 
2003: 138) 
Once accounted for, additional qualifiers are useful to determine the potential of 
social capital. One possibility is to take Paxton´s idea of per se value of social 
capital in a latent state and separate it by dimension. The result is set of four 
categories of productivity shown in Figure 2.1.  Societies with individuals with 
high trust/reciprocity and high participation in networks or organizations would be 
classified as active in terms of social capital use and hence the most productive 
and efficient. On the opposite extreme we would have unproductive societies 
with low or non-existing social capital. The other two categories would be 
classified as potentially productive but inefficient; however those societies with 
high trust maybe viewed as of higher potential than those with low level of trust15. 
Within this categorization my arguments will be that in Mexico: (a) the great 
majority of the stocks of social capital are found in cell “B” in a inefficient state but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Paxton suggest that social capital is only present in category “A” of Figure 2.1. My contribution 
is to recognize social capital and qualify it in all four categories. 
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with high potential to be detonated; and (2) crime and corruption threaten to 
move the stocks of available social capital from “B” to “C”.  
According to Groeter and Bastelaer (2002) social capital works on two 
continuums, one has to do with the level of impact (micro to macro) and the other 
on the meaning of the concept (structural to cognitive).  Any group activity (i.e. 
social networks) belongs to the structural category and any aspect of trust to the 
cognitive.  In their classification reciprocity operates everywhere.  Thus we end 
up with a useful map of social capital that differentiates the micro and macro level 
impact of trust and networks with reciprocity dancing around all over the place. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Categorization of the productivity of social capital 
 
  STRUCUTURAL DIMENSION 
Objective Associations 
  High Low 
High (A) Productive and efficient 
 
(B) Productive but 
inefficient. 
High potential. 
 
COGNITIVE 
DIMESNION 
 
Subjective type or ties 
(trust and reciprocity) Low 
 
(C) Productive but 
inefficient. 
Low potential. 
 
 
(D) Unproductive: 
Low or Non existent 
 
 
Source: adapted from Paxton 1999 
 
This map provides better clues on where to look for social capital, however 
because of the nature of the classification it does not solve the problem of diffuse 
conceptualization.  For the authors structural manifestation can include any type 
of interaction among people (formal or informal networks) for any type of purpose 
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(social, economic, cultural, etc).  The cognitive aspect is also very general as it 
includes hard grasping constructs such as values, norms, and trust.  This 
conceptual generalization present two problems; on one part the components 
can include practically every type of human interaction, and on the other we have 
the complex interconnectedness of the components of social capital that is not 
solved by providing a clearer or more complex maps of categorization16.  
Another influential set of scholars such as Woolcock (2001), prefer to use a 
different map.  They rely on a more parsimonious classification of social capital 
around three basic trust-centered forms of the phenomena: bonding (trust in 
family or ethnic groups), bridging (trust in others) and linking (trust within 
institutionalized interaction)17. These types of conceptualizations can be defined 
as cognitive or trust centered. However in such definitions of the concept, linking 
can be viewed as similar to networks/structures but given greater emphasis on 
the importance of trust and its performance.  The role and importance of 
reciprocity is not evident under such schema.  The discussion is complemented 
by Granoveter (1973) by qualifying the intensity of the relations: “the strength of a 
tie is a ... combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy 
... and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie”. I will later argue that 
crime and corruption negatively impact all of these determinants of a relation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For example, trust is both a prerequisite and a result of interaction: if I trust I participate and if I 
participate I increase (or decrease) my trust in others.  Reciprocity is an incentive for interaction 
and trust (I have future benefits of trusting you and thus I decide to cooperate/participate) but it 
can also be a prerequisite (I trust/interact only if I know for a fact that is beneficial for me). Thus 
social capital becomes too many things at once. 
17 Based on the influential work by Woolcock and Healy many posterior authors have treated 
these types of trust as types of social capital. For me bonding, bridging and linking represent 
“subaccounts” of the trust component. See Figure 2.2. 
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thus hurting social capital. An additional contribution of Granoveter is the 
classification of ties as strong, weak or absent that can be positive, negative 
and/or asymmetric (1973, 1361). The last type could play an especially important 
role in cleintilistic political systems such as Mexico in the last half of the XIX 
century under the PRI rule. 
Many other influential definitions of social capital can be found in the literature; 
those by Healy, Wolcook and Cote, and Paldam are good examples. Most of 
them provide a general/normative definition and are usually cognitive or 
structural laden. In order to focus the scope of my research it is useful to 
consider a more concise definition of the concept that is limited to the two 
dimension-three component scope and avoids the use of catch-all concepts that 
include multiple values/norms in the cognitive dimension. This is viewed as a 
practical minimum common denominator. 
 
2.2.3 Consensus: two dimensions, three components 
As it was mention above, the main proponents of the concept of social 
capital coincide at what appears to be a minimum common denominator of the 
term with two dimensions (cognitive and structural) and three components (trust, 
reciprocity and participation)18. The argument for trust and reciprocity as the main 
(or exclusive) components of the cognitive dimension can be made from rational 
choice theory.  From this perspective the two components serve as lubricants19 in 
social interactions that increase the “propensity to play the cooperative solution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Kaasa and Parts (2008) provide a precise diagram of the two dimensions conceptualization 
with a breakdown of components but fail to include “reciprocity” in the cognitive dimension.  
19 Paldam characterizes social capital as “the ‘glue’ generating excess cooperation” (2000: 629) 
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even if it is not the (Nash) equilibrium” (Paldam 2000: 637).  In other words, if 
individuals trust each other and have some expectations of mutual retribution, 
then it is likely, and in their interest, that they will cooperate when they interact. 
Many other cultural traits could be considered as valuable for social relations or 
social cooperation such as tolerance, compromise, and responsibility. However 
the literature has identified trust and reciprocity as key ingredients for social 
capital. As pointed out before, in its origins and “Despite the differences, 
[Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam] ... consider that social capital consists of 
personal connections and interpersonal interaction, together with the shared sets 
of values that are associated with these contacts.” (Field 2003: 13). However 
more recent literature has produce –conceptually or empirically– a reduction of 
scope in the cognitive dimension by focusing mainly (and almost exclusively) on 
trust alone or both trust and reciprocity. 
The structural dimension is more clearly define and identifiable. It refers mainly to 
the networks of relations or groups in which an individual belongs or participates. 
Its operationalisation or accounting can be achieved in many ways such as 
available networks, membership or participation in formal or informal groups, 
network of personal relations by type (strong, weak or absent) or voluntary work. 
As suggested, in this reduction of the scope of the concept it is assumed that the 
dimensions and components are correlated in a positive way. For example, the 
more an individual participates in a group the more it creates trust amongst the 
group members; or the more an individual experiences reciprocity when 
interacting with others the more likely s/he will increase her/his trust on them. 
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This interaction between dimensions/components can be viewed as a mutually 
interacting and/or reinforcing system20.  
Defining social capital as a two dimensions-three component concept has two 
main purposes. The first is that it clarifies and limits its scope allowing us to 
provide a concise definition of the term. The second is that it helps its 
operationalisation because it provides a clear guide of what to measure in 
empirical analysis of social capital. It follows that we could provide a potentially 
exhaustive set of accounts that could measure the stocks of social capital of a 
given society. Illustrated in Figure 2.2 is an example of an accounting system for 
a two dimension-three component definition of social capital. As illustrated in 
figure 2.2, some (sub) components of social capital are perceptions, some are 
experiences and some are behaviors. It is in this sense that this type of capital 
can be more complex and have greater social, economical and political 
implications than other types of capital. The purpose is not to try to provide a 
comprehensive list; such endeavor would be quit difficult21, but rather to show 
that the concept consists of multiple (sub) accounts22. Similar to how we would 
construct a detail accounting of the stocks of financial capital where we would 
need to consider cash as well as long and short-term investment, fixed assets, 
debt, etc.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 An interesting example of the interaction between components is provided by Shah et. al. 
(2010) in their 4X4 interactive social capital matrix where a 16 interactions system is produced by 
the relation of four key stakeholders: Individuals, Community, Organizations and State. 
21 The list would be potentially very large, as different authors have included different proxies or 
measurement of what can be counted as social capital. One author, for example, considers 
parental involvement as a form of social capital of children (see Hango 2005). For some this 
particular indicator could be included as a sub-account in the structural dimension.  
22 See Narayan and Cassidiy (2001, 67) for a larger inventory and list of potential accounts with 
twenty-seven subaccounts.  
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I will use a two dimension-three component definition as a practical way of 
defining, limiting and orientating the research. As suggested above, social capital 
can be a double-edge sword, before discussing the definition of the concept to be 
use here, I will discuss in general terms its positive and negative effects. 
 
Figure 2.2. An example of an integral accounting system for a  
two dimension-three component definition of social capital 
 
1. Cognitive Dimension 
a. Trust 
i. Interpersonal trust (bonding and bridging) 
ii. Institutional trust (linking) 
b. Reciprocity 
i. Perceived reciprocity 
ii. Received reciprocity  
 
2. Structural dimension 
a. Membership in formal organizations 
b. Membership in informal organizations 
c. Participation in formal organizations 
d. Participation in informal organizations 
e. Network of personal relations 
i. Strong ties 
ii. Weak ties 
f. Voluntarism 
 
 
2.2.4. The Power of Social Capital 
 Many beneficial outcomes can be achieved from a healthy degree of trust 
and reciprocity between individuals and from an active and organized civil 
society. I provide here some examples of the positive impact of social capital on 
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society, democracy and the economy to illustrate the power of social capital. In 
the next section the dark side of social capital will be discussed. 
The most salient category of the beneficial impact of social capital is the body of 
work linked to the political culture theory, the so called “civic voluntarism model” 
initiated by Toqueveille and explored empirically by authors such as Almond and 
Verba, Putnam, Ingleheart and Seligson and pursued in the agendas of 
international institutions like the World Bank. One of the main theses of the 
earliest theorist of social capital is precisely that trust and civic engagement 
enhance democratic attitudes in general (Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993), and 
there are specific examples of this such as its impact on political tolerance (Cigler 
and Joslyn 2002).  
But there is a plethora of additional scientific explorations in the field of political 
science, sociology and economy --most based on empirical findings-- that show a 
wide variety of positive effects. The following are examples of these scholarly 
work that illustrates other positive effects that have been explored: economic 
growth or economic development or sustainable development (Grootaert 1998, 
Woolcock 2001, Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2009, Skidmore 2000); effects on 
government efficiency (Boix and Posner 1998); transition to democracy (Paldam 
and Svendsen 2000); impact on technical progress and economic growth 
(Fukuyama 2001, Antoci et. al. 2009); poverty alleviation (Woolcock and Narayan 
2000); how cognitive social capital benefits the adoption of corporate social 
responsibility of firms (Sacconi and Degli 2011); happiness and life satisfaction 
and living standards (Sarracino 2001 and Pugno and Verme 2012, Adriani and 
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Karyampas 2010, Groot et. al. 2007); and personal health (d´Hombres et. al. 
2006). 
It is worth mentioning that there is a growing literature that focuses on how the 
digital world (i.e. online social networks) are shaping the interaction between 
individuals and with what consequences (see Antoci et. al. 2011a and 2011b for 
examples) many of which are treated favorably because of the growing networks 
formed on line. After all, nowadays terms like “social networks” refer to the 
growing interaction of individuals on line. 
All of these examples are evidence of the potential benefits of social capital. I do 
not mean to take a normative approach towards the concept, but rather 
acknowledge that it is potentially beneficial that have been documented 
extensively.  
 
2.2.5 The Dark Side of Social Capital  
As it was mentioned above, if we are dealing with a concept that includes 
the term capital, we most assume among other things: (a) that its existence and 
quantity can be determined; and (b) that such stock of capital has a value per se, 
even when it is not being use. An additional characteristic of the family of 
capitals, with two important implications, is that its use can have positive or 
negative (sometimes both) consequences for an individual or a group of 
individuals. The first implication is straightforward: social capital can be use for 
good or for evil. The drug cartels or organized crime can be used to exemplify 
this. Individuals efficiently operate these networks with a significant degree of 
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trust amongst them. The Medellin Cartel in the early 90´s or the exponential 
growth of organized crime in the north and center of Mexico in recent years are 
examples of this. 
The second implication has to do with how benefits are distributed among a 
society and it could be viewed as negative when it increases social inequalities. 
The words of Paldam illustrate this point: “Social capital may turn out to be 
conservative or even harmful in some cases, even if it is productive and benign in 
other cases” (2000: 635). “Social capital can promote inequality because access 
to different types of networks is very unequally distributed.” (Field 2003: 74,) This 
is because a payoff can be determined by the quality or specific weight of the 
connection, which is especially true in hierarchical societies (Portes 1998 and Lin 
2001). However we should warn that this is a network biased conception of social 
capital and we could make a counterargument that an increase in capital maybe 
more beneficial to lower income individuals (or proportionally more so to less 
connected individuals) that are also likely to bear the cost of unequal access to 
networks. This is partially the view of agencies like the World Bank that perceive 
the high potential of social capital when new networks are created targeting lower 
income communities. If there is evidence to recognize that social capital is 
potentially beneficial and it can be of crucial relevance for the developed world, 
then it is important to know how and to what extent existing stocks of social 
capital are depleted by crime and corruption.  This will be discussed in greater 
length when we explore the relation between social capital, democracy and 
development later in the chapter.  
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In sum the harmful effects of social capital can contribute to reinforce inequality 
or support negative behavior (Field 2003). The literature uses the term “dark side 
of social capital” for situations where social capital has these or other kind of 
negative impacts. In my approach social capital is viewed in its positive form, in 
terms of cooperation efficiency that enhance benefits for individuals but we 
should recognize that such cooperation could have positive or negative 
consequences for some individuals or even as a total outcome for a given 
society. And the same can be said of other types of capitals; in fact all capitals 
should be viewed as double-edge swords.  
 
2.3 My definition of social capital 
I would like to propose a definition of the concept that (a) can clearly guide 
the research agenda; (b) that is contained within the two dimension three 
components limits; and (c) that focuses on the actual and potential productivity of 
these components. Under such guidelines, and as a starting point, social capital 
would be defined simply and straightforward as the stocks of trust, reciprocity 
and networks found on a given social unit in a certain point in time. A quantity: a 
non-normative and neutral calculation of stocks of certain attitudes and 
interactions between individuals. But further, I propose to qualify this definition by 
viewing trust as the currency of social capital, reciprocity as the incentive to 
invest that currency and networks (formal and informal) as places where 
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investment can take place with the optimal outcome of such investment being 
cooperative behavior and/or increase value of the currency23.   
This proposed definition allows for social capital to exist, at least in a latent state, 
when any of its components are present.  Additionally, under such 
conceptualization the importance of trust is highlighted as a cause of cooperative 
behavior and network formation (implied in Paldam´s work) but it also recognizes 
mutual causation between the dimensions and components. It also helps 
explains how the trust-reciprocity and trust-network complex are determined 
and/or determine the individuals expected (and real) amount of benefits or 
payoffs. Even tough trust is not a necessary condition for common action (i.e 
cooperation between individuals) –an interaction does not necessarily imply trust-
- it can be argued that it does increase the likelihood of such cooperation.  The 
same can be said for reciprocity.  In other words, for two individuals to act 
together, I do not have to trust and individual or believe that my actions may be 
repaid in the future.  However, trust and reciprocity do increase the likelihood, 
intensity and future of cooperative behavior between individuals.   This can be 
taken as an axiom in social capital theory. Also implied in the definition, and a 
somewhat generalized agreement found in the literature, is the assumptions that 
activity within networks (i.e. social interaction and cooperation) produces trust.  
As stated up to here, my definition of social capital is neutral, recognizes a latent 
state of social capital and depicts the type of interactions between 
dimensions/components as recursive or reinforcing or of mutual causation (see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Such characterization is influenced by Lin´s definition of social capital as “an investment in 
social relations with expected returns in the marketplace” (2001, 6) and also by the concept of 
“credit slips” found in Coleman (1994). 
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Figure 2.3). Additionally it has the benefit of guiding the measurement of the 
stock of social capital of a given society on a certain point in time. If we can 
define what constitute each of the three components or sub-components (see 
Figure 2.2) we can then try to operationalise them in order to provide a precise 
empirical measurement of each. In part my work constitutes an in-depth proposal 
of an integral measurement of social capital using survey research. A detail 
discussion on the validity and reliability of the main instrument used to test my 
hypothesis is provided in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 2.3: Causal relation between the dimensions 
and components of social capital 
 
                                                                  
                              
 
 
2.4 The Power of Trust 
Barber defines trust as “socially learned and socially confirmed 
expectations that people have of each other, of the organizations and institutions 
in which they live, and of the natural and moral social orders, that set the 
fundamental understanding for their lives.” (Barber 1983 163). Such 
conceptualization implies three characteristics of trust:  (a) individuals have some 
 
Trust 
Reci-
procity 
Cognitive 
Dimension 
 
Structural 
Dimension 
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knowledge and expectancy/certainty of how the others will act when interaction 
occurs; (b) it is a matter of degree; and (c) it is condition to the specific to the 
subject of the interaction. This last point is especially important because it 
defines trust as particular and it implies that an individual can trust some 
(individual or institutions) but at the same time distrust others. Trust as Rotter 
points out “is specific rather than generalized” (1971: 444).  Individuals do not 
have a single level of trust that defines their interaction with every object or 
subject they encounter. 
The work of Tway, which focuses on trust in organization, is a critic of those who 
treat trust as a single entity or a single concept. His definition of the concept is 
simple and straightforward: “state of readiness for unguarded interaction either 
with someone or something” and he continues, “We even trust that our 
perceptions of what is real are truly ‘real’.  Without this unguarded interaction ... 
life would be impossible” (1994: 8-9). 
A lot of work has been conducted using a measure of generalized trust included 
in the earlier versions of the World Value Survey. Even thought the OECD 
qualifies this definition an acceptable proxy of trust, Field is critical of such proxy 
but recognizes that “the apparent simplicity of measure can be extremely 
misleading” (2003, 125). I am also critical of such measure for several reasons 
but mainly because the definition of trust indicates that it is particular to the 
interaction in questions and therefore it cannot be general (or generalized)24. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Additional arguments for the measurement of generalized trust uses in the WVS are that it has 
range restriction problems, the risk of measuring a potentially complex (in terms of variability in 
intensity due to specificity) concept with a single indicator and that are its response options are 
not mutually excluding. 
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Uslaner argues that trust has a moral foundation and suggests that the 
generalized trust is the best indicator because it reflects “positive views of 
strangers, of people who are different from ourselves and presume that they are 
trustworthy” (2002: 2, italics in original).  This is perfectly fine but it ignores two 
important facts: (1) once you interact with a stranger he becomes a familiar 
subject for which a specific level of trust will be bestowed based upon experience 
and perceptions; and (2) most of our daily interactions are with people that are 
familiar with us, not with strangers.  Hence a single item measurement at the 
most generalized level will only capture a fraction of the general trust between 
individuals. The biggest problem with using a single measure of trust can be 
summarized by the words of Chun and Campbell: “When a measure is either less 
than fully refined or not linked with substantive theory, the data which 
accumulated from its continued use are likely to be coarse in quality and 
equivocal in meaning.  The accumulation of studies in turn increases the 
pressure for further use of the same measures, thus completing a spiraling cycle” 
(Chun and Campbell 1974 – cited in Tway 1994). I subscribe to this point of view 
and use for this dissertation, a multiple-items measure of trust that is relational 
specific; I also provide multi-item measurements of other key variables of my 
research. 
Why is trust so important within the two-dimension-three-component definition of 
social capital? On the one hand, it is an easier concept to define and measure 
that reciprocity. But mainly it has to do with the fact that trust is a crucial factor of 
social relations.  “Perhaps there is no single variable which so thoroughly 
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influences interpersonal and group behavior as does trust ... trust acts as a 
salient factor in determining the character of a huge range of relationships” 
(McConkie 1975 cited in Tway 1994). Fukuyama offers a definition of trust that 
has clear social implications for the three basic forms of trust.  He defines it as 
the “expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and co-
operative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other 
members of the community…” (1995: 26). Rotter confirms its importance by 
stating that “The entire fabric of our day-to-day living, of our social order, rest on 
trust—buying gasoline, paying taxes, going to the dentist, flying to a 
convention—almost all of our decisions involve trusting someone else.  The more 
complex the society, the greater the dependence on others” (1971: 443).  These 
statements clearly define trust as a powerful predictor of human behavior.     
The social capital literature provides evidence of the positive outcome of high 
levels of trust at the individual or aggregate level.  The words of Putnam serve to 
illustrate this: “Other things being equal, people who trust their fellow citizens 
volunteer more often, contribute more to charity, participate more often in politics 
and community originations, serve more readily on juries, give blood more 
frequently, comply more fully with their tax obligations, are more tolerant of 
minority views, and display many other forms of civic virtues” (2000: 136).  It is 
precisely because trust is potentially a crucial explanatory variable of many 
concepts that we need to measure it with precision employing valid and reliable 
indicators.  
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To finish the review on the importance of trust it is relevant to point out that there 
are several types of trust as it was stated above, and that it is not a necessary 
condition, but rather a qualifier, for interactions to occur. According to Stone there 
are different types of trust, the most important being: familiar, civic (i.e. as 
individual relates to as citizen), social (generalized, relate as strangers) and 
institutional (2001).  Paxton presents a different but comparable classification: 
between the individual to (a) another individual; (b) another individual in a group 
setting and (c) to a collection of individuals (1999, 98). As stated above, I believe 
that social capital can exist in a latent state and as such no actual interaction has 
to occur in order for trust to exist; this makes possible to measure trust as an 
attitude (or even as a perception). This is important because when we measure 
trust in a survey, we are capturing an attitude defined by past 
interaction/experience that will determine future interactions. In this sense, trust 
can be a partial indicator of the performance of available networks.  
 
2.5. Social capital and democracy 
The positive link between trust and democracy was suggested in the 
previous section. This section covers a more general discussion of democracy 
and its relation to social capital with a focus on the Latin America region and later 
in Mexico. 
The way we define democracy has important consequences for theory building 
and research design.  In defining democracy the main challenge is to find a 
balance between analytic differentiation (diversity) and conceptual validity 
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(setting standards) while avoiding the problems of conceptual confusion and lack 
of consistency when assessing causality (Collier and Levitsky 1997). While there 
is not a single definition of democracy most of the literature accepts “electoral 
democracy” as the minimum standard for differentiating a democratic from a non-
democratic regime.  For many, a better minimum standard is found in Dahl’s 
definition of polyarchy (1971).  In comparative research, after setting a minimum 
standard to separate democratic from non-democratic regimes, different 
components serve to classify the type of democracy of each country (illiberal, 
hegemonic party, constitutional defect, etc.).  After all, democracy is an ongoing 
process, as Schmitter states “the label democracy hides a continuous evolution 
in rules and practices and an extraordinary diversity of institutions” (1992: 444), 
and as Farer qualifies, democracy is a “matter of definition” but it is also a “matter 
of degree” (1996: 3)25.  
Two important questions of the literature on democratization are: what causes 
democracy (i.e. correlates of democratic stability)26 and what is the state of 
democracies in Latin America27 (i.e. the quality of democracy)? To answer these 
questions there is a growing dialogue within and between the main schools of 
thought: economic performance, political institutions and representation of social 
groups, and political culture/civil society28. Such conversation is producing better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Lowenthal provides an example of this when he cautions that in Latin American elections are 
the norm “but their meaning and validity vary greatly” (1997: 59). 
26 A good summary of the key causes is found in Lipset (1994). 
27 I will focus my review of the literature of democracy in Latin America. 
28 Two additional important correlates found in the literature are external factors/international 
relations (Farer 1996) and mode of transition.  These are influenced and/or informed by the 
democratization (transition) literature: economic and social modernization (Lipset 1994), structural 
perspective (Collier, Collier 1991) and elite strategic behavior (O’Donnell and Schimitter 1986). 
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methodologies and complementing and qualifying explanations29. As stated 
above, both the cognitive and structural dimensions of social capital can be taken 
as important factors of these three correlates.  
Studies of democracy in Latin America have revolved around three central 
questions that are closely related: how did it happen (transition), what is the 
outcome (state of democratic governance), and what are its chances 
(consolidation)?  The third wave of democratization in Latin America was 
inaugurated with the restoration of democratic institutions in Ecuador in 197930.  
More than a quarter of a century later  “the durability of third wave democracies, 
once a matter of concern, is now a source of surprise: democratic collapse thus 
far remains the exception rather than the rule.” (Cruz 2003: 88). Democracy in 
the region has so far, survived severe economic crisis (Mexico and Argentina), 
political crisis (Peru and Ecuador) and social crisis (Central America, Colombia, 
Venezuela and Bolivia).  However, there are recent events within the region that 
present question such democratic normality in the region, mainly in the ALBA 
countries. Lowenthal´s warning can be viewed as still valid: “talk of consolidating 
democracy is premature and misleading … because it implies that democratic 
institutions exist and need only to be reinforce.  This is not the case in most Latin 
America, where democratic governance is far from assured” (1997: 61). Low 
levels of economic, social and political institutionalization are indeed a reality in 
many countries of the region.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 According to Huntington (1997) they are interdependent and play specific roles; according to 
Inglehart  (1997) they should be viewed as mutually supportive causes not deterministic; and 
according to Dahl (1989) the three correlates are interdependent; and there is not a unique 
pattern/path of such interdependence. 
30 See Colburn (2002) for a precise record of dates of the transitions of each country. 
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The concept of democratic consolidation is of problematic nature.  While it 
appeared to be appropriate under the enthusiastic post-authoritarian frame, it 
soon became obvious that it was a diffuse concept.  While most authors agree on 
Dahl’s concept of polyarchy31 as the minimum requirement to start discussing the 
possibility of consolidation --O’Donnell, Linz and Stepan, Huntington, Schimitter 
among others-- we find a growing desencanto with the term consolidation32. We 
are back studying democracy rather than consolidation. O’Donnell provides the 
following definition of institution: “regularized pattern of interaction that is known, 
practiced, and accepted (if not necessarily approved) by actors who expect to 
continue interacting under the rules sanctioned and backed by the pattern” 
(1997: 42)33.  Under such definition institutions and norms are basically the 
same, and it is in this sense that attitudes such as trust and reciprocity together 
with behaviors such as civic participation, could definitely impact the degree and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 According to Dahl (1989) there are seven main attributes that characterize polyarchy: elected 
authorities, free and clean elections, universal vote, right to compete for public post, freedom of 
expression, alternative sources of information and freedom of association (taken from O´Donell 
1996). 
32 According to Diamond (1997), most of the contributors of the literature, converge in a concept 
of consolidation “as a discernible process by which the rules, institutions and constraints of 
democracy come to constitute “the only game in town,” the only legitimate framework for seeking 
and exercising political power” (1997: xvi-xvii; the definition is attributed to Linz) . On “Illusions 
about Consolidation”, O’Donnell (1996b), one of the most provocative scholars of consolidation 
and certainly one of the most important on Latin American democratization, makes two crucial 
arguments.  The first one is that it is not a good idea to mix two highly polysemic concepts.  This 
argument had also been forwarder by Scheduler (conceptual disorder of the term) and by 
Gunther (double-barrelled concept).  The second argument points out a key weakness of Linz’s 
“only game in town” definition.  He reminded us of the importance of informal rules in the LA 
democracies.  If polyarchy is “embodied in an institutional package” and if informality (due to the 
presence of the practice of particularism in most of the region) is a key characteristic of Latin 
American democracies, we have an empirical problem in trying to study consolidation. 
33 My only objection to O’Donnell assessment is his deterministic treatment of particularism in 
Latin America.  He identifies the presence of particularism (rules within the game) within formal 
institutions (the game) and seems to conclude that we are condemned to live with such norms. 
For example he argues that electoral process have been sustained by international pressure 
rather than by local institutionalization.  While this maybe true in some cases (Peru after the 
fujimoraso for example) it is not in most. 
 53	  
quality of democracy. Schmitter (1992) is even clearer in linking interaction and 
behaviour: “social relations [that] become social structures, i.e., patterns of 
interaction can become so regular in their occurrence, so endowed with meaning, 
so capable of motivating behavior that they become autonomous in their internal 
function and resistance to externally induced change”. 
A great deal of institutionalization of democracy then becomes a question of what 
we do, how we do it, who we do it with. Effective institutionalization is what we 
need to transit from informal practices to formal norms of democracy and by this I 
mean (a) clear definition of the “rules of the game” and (b) the ability to enforce 
such rules34.  As suggested above, there are conceptual problems in the term 
democratic consolidation, however the goals of democratic consolidation (i.e. 
expectations of regime continuity) are still present and drive much of the 
research. Regardless of the label we continue to study the main topics included 
in the consolidation literature: “diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization 
of anti-system actors, the removal of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the 
organization of functional interest, the routinization of politics, judicial reform, the 
decentralization of state power, and the alleviation of poverty” (Schedler 1998: 2). 
And others have recently been added to the agenda such as human rights, 
women and democracy, public opinion, market reforms, and labor (Dominguez 
2003). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 A good example of this is the recently created Institute for the Access of Information in Mexico 
(IFAI). Since its creation (rules) and because is has been successfully enforced (only game) 
Mexico has witness an increase access/diffusion of government information increasing the 
accountability of key political actors and institutions. 
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In terms of the discussion around the state of democracy we find additional 
factors that have an impact on its quality.  These factors are usually viewed in a 
negative form because they are missing or because they have poor quality (or 
scope) or because they present a threat to the stability of democracy.  These 
include abuse of power, repression, corruption, criminality, political violence 
(Diamond 1997, Aguero and Starks 1998), ethnic differences (Huntington 1997, 
Linz and Stepan 1996), “pervasive particularism, delegative rule and weak 
horizontal accountability” (O’Donnell 1998), and simultaneous political and 
economic reform (Linz and Stepan 1996).  They should not be viewed as a single 
debate, but rather a complex set of smaller debates on the impact (if exist and to 
what degree) of specific factors and thus beyond the scope of my research and 
impossible to cover here35.  
So how does social capital impact democracy? As I have stated above, 
democracy is an ongoing process with different components that define its 
presence and/or quality. Mainly the economic conditions, the political institutions 
and the political culture impact it.  In general terms, trust and reciprocity can have 
a direct effect on the economy, political institutions and in turn these are 
impacted by social participation. Additionally the cognitive aspect of social capital 
can be taken as an important part of the political culture of a given society. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For example the ethnic argument as a potential source of erosion has been a clear source of 
conflict in Arab countries or East Europe and it can be argued for countries with highly indigenous 
populations in Latin America, however it is not a given result where cultural differences exist.  
Recently Huntington made the highly controversial and unempirical argument that “persistent 
inflows of Hispanic immigrants, threaten to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures 
and two languages” (Huntington 2004).  There is substantial evidence, -mostly based on public 
opinion polls like the ones conducted by Roderic Camp or Wayne Cornelius) - that the opposite 
(integration) is happening, explained in part with what Latin calls “competitive-assimilation game”, 
spawn from socialization and participation theory. 
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Specifically, the positive link between social capital and democracy has been 
illustrated by many scholarly contributions (Baron et al. 2000, Paldam 2000). 
According to Inglehart, “The literature on democratic theory suggests that mass 
participation, interpersonal trust, tolerance of minority groups, and free speech 
are important to the consolidation and stability of democracy” (1997: 3). Paxton’s 
(2020) review of the literature shows that there is sufficient empirical evidence 
between levels of social capital and maintenance of democracy and that trust can 
have a positive effect on political tolerance and political dialogue within a society 
and demonstrates that participation trough associations have a positive impact 
on democracy that is recursive36. Social Capital has external and internal effects 
on democracy37.  The external effects can be summarized as a mean of social 
action, in which –using Putnam’s words-- “… individual and otherwise quiet 
voices multiply and are amplified” (2000: 338).  The internal effect is concisely 
defined as a “school for democracy” (Putnam 2000: 339). For all these reasons, 
from a social capital perspective, the discussion on the institutionalization and 
quality of democracy can be summarized by the words of Cruz: “no strong civic 
microfoundation, no strong democracy” (2003: 100). Figure 2.4 illustrates the 
positive causal relation between the dimensions of social capital and democracy. 
Additionally the positive link between democracy and development has been 
documented from several perspectives; by sequence of political en economic 
reforms (Person and Tabellini 2006), performance of political economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Some case studies challenge high level of trust and civil society are necessary requirements 
for a democracy; see Fatton (1995) and Gibson (2001). 
37 But we most we aware of generalizations: “The mechanism by which social capital is supposed 
to produce such a range of laudable outcomes are over-general and under-specified” (Li, Pickles 
and Savage 2003). 
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institutions (Henson and Jerome 2007) and mainly due to its close relation to 
Human Capital.  
According to Coleman changes in knowledge (and health) determine human 
capital by providing new skill and abilities for the individual; and changes in trust 
(and other norms) determine social capital by facilitating cooperative behavior 
(1998, 100). It appears then that trust is to social capital as knowledge is to 
human capital.  They are both potentially beneficial assets of individuals and/or 
groups, and they appear to be a partial element of the concept they represent. 
According to Eve Parts “No country has achieved sustained economic growth 
without a high level of education” (2003 – 15) --a key component of human 
capital, and the two concepts can be related in several directions of causality with 
development (see Figure 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.4: Causal relation between the dimensions of 
social capital and democracy 
 
           
 
           
 
 
More recently, studies of happiness and quality of life have also included social 
capital as components or correlates.38 There is empirical evidence that “in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For example a Mexican NGO has conducted two surveys on the quality of life that include 
specific measures of trust and participation, this is an example of how social capital is being 
Cognitive 
Dimension 
Structural 
Dimension 
Democratic 
Attitudes 
 57	  
general, social capital broadly does what the theorist have claimed: to put it 
crudely, people who are able to draw on others for support are healthier than 
those who cannot; they are also happier and wealthier; their children do better at 
school, and their communities suffer less from anti-social behavior” (Field 2003: 
45) 
Figure 2.5: Causal relation between social capital, 
human capital and development 
 
                                                          
                       
 
Modern political history in Mexico can be viewed as one with increased civic 
involvement with the following crucial inflection points: the student movement of 
1968, the first state election in modern times won by an opposition party (Baja 
California 1989), the Zapatista social movement of 1994 (coinciding with the 
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement), the electoral reforms on 
the 90´s, alternation of government in the city of Mexico (1997) and in the 
presidency (2000)39. The growth of the civic society was parallel to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
considered part of the quality of live and linked to other components of this general concept that 
tap into the quality of democracy. The surveys can be found in: http://www.jaliscocomovamos.org 
39 For a detail account of the political situation and sexenal crisis in Mexico from 1968 to 1987 see 
Basañez (1990). For a discussion on the political changes in Mexico after the 1990´s see 
Dominguez (2004). See also Knight (1996) and Hernandez Valdez (2000). 
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advancement of democracy in Mexico. However in the last decade or so, 
coinciding with the push of civil society, the country has experienced increased 
levels of crime and corruptions that will be documented in the last chapter that 
show, But more importantly, data will be presented to analyze that, at the 
individual level, perceptions and experience of crime and corruption have a 
negative impact on the two dimensions-three component of social capital. There 
should be some concern on the quality of democracy in Mexico due to the fact 
that comparative data shows the decrease of key political culture indicators in 
Mexico from 2004 to 2012, a period in which the country has experience a public 
safety crisis. Using data form the Americas Barometer, Paras and Romero 
(2012) show that from 2004 to 2012 an indicator for stable democracy has 
decreased from 41% to 26% while an indicator of authoritarian stability has 
increased from 23% to 34% of the adult population. 
I turn now to a central question: how do crime and corruption impact social 
capital? 
 
2.6 The link between crime/corruption and social capital 
A review of the literature conducted by Krishna and Uphoff (1999) 
identified eight determinants of social capital but do not include crime or 
corruption40. The exploration of this link is fairly recent and an ongoing 
discussion. The analytical model presented in the next chapter controls for some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The eight determinants are (1) prior collective action experience; (2) existence of rule of 
behaviors; (3) extent of participation in decision-making; (4) quantity of sources of information; 
(5) education; (6) economic status; (7) demographic characteristics; and (8) district history. 
More recent literature has added additional determinants like inequality/income (Cordova 
2006); gender or hours spent using Facebook (Ertan 2011). 
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key demographics characteristics but it is mainly interested in exploring to what 
degree the dimensions/components of social capital are being impacted by crime 
and corruption. Heinemann and Verner group the costs of violence into four 
categories: direct monetary cost, non-monetary cost, economic multiplier effects 
and social multiplier effects (2006, 9). The link discussed here should be included 
in the last category; according to the author it erodes social capital and social 
fabric. In the following lines we discuss this key relation to my research starting 
with the link between crime/corruption and the cognitive dimension of social 
capital.  
According to Krishna there are three competing hypothesis on the causal 
placement and theoretical importance of the concept of social capital.  The first 
category is the Social Capital Thesis, representing the work of those who explain 
many social phenomenons as being related causally to the concept.  Putnam 
belongs in this category. The structuralist or institutionalist present the opposite 
argument and treat it as a residual of structures. “The structuralist rejoinder 
against social capital picks up on what is perhaps the weakest point of the social 
capital thesis: the issue of origins.  How is social capital brought into being, and 
why do levels of social capital vary from one society to another?” The 
intermediate position asserts only marginal causality (Krishna 2002: 14-19).  My 
work could be classified as structuralist where I view crime and corruption as 
structures that impact trust and participation. However I prefer what I would 
consider a fourth category: interdependence relation, which is how Inglehart 
views the relation between culture and structures. This focus also allows for 
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recursive relations between variables. The discussion of the importance of 
culture or structures on social capital formation is beyond the scope of my 
research. In the following lines I review empirical studies that show –with different 
directions of causality—that there is significant relation between crime/corruption 
and social capital. 
As stated above, trust plays an important role in my research, as it can be the 
strongest theoretical link between experience and perceptions of crime/corruption 
and social capital. It seams plausible to think that crime and corruption can 
undermine current or future stocks of trust in others (particularly bridging, often 
referred to as “thin trust”) that the individuals have amongst each other. Putnam 
work shows that at the aggregate level41, trust is a social necessity with desirable 
spillover effects, and crime and social trust are negatively correlated (2000: 136-
138 and 308)42. He states: “higher levels of social capital, all else being equal, 
translate into lower levels of crime” (Putnam 2000: 308) a similar conclusion is 
reached by other authors (Halpern 2001, Rosenfeld et. al. 2001, Gatti et. al. 
2003, Akcomak and Weel 2008). Arguing a reverse causality, the work of 
Seligson shows that crime and violence impact the level of social trust and 
decrease the stocks of social capital (2000).  Other authors find the same causal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 However while these findings are important, they are limited and potentially underpowered as 
he looks exclusively at the relation between homicide and cognitive aspects of social capital. 
Putnam relies on aggregate level data, and assumes the causal arrow going from social 
capital to crime.  Putnam places social capital as an independent variable impacting several 
dependent while others make the reverse assumption. 
42 An additional relevant study, as it directly relates to my research question and draws 
conclusion from individuals rather than aggregates, is the work of Brehm and Rahn.  They 
point out that one of the characteristics of Social Capital is that “is an aggregate concept that 
has its basis in individual behavior, attitudes, and predispositions”, further “[i]t is not a 
‘community’ that participates or builds trust, but the people who compromise that community 
who belong to civic organizations and acquire positive feelings towards others” (1997: 1000-
1003). However their research is limited in terms of the construct measurement. 
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direction for interpersonal trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997, Seligson 2000).  In part 
the issue of causality has to do with the level of analysis and in general we find 
that scholars looking at aggregates place social capital as the independent 
variable but those working at the individual differences level claim the opposite 
placement.  
Since I work with survey research data, and my analysis is at the individual level 
differences, I will treat social capital as a dependent variable and will test if it is 
impacted by crime/corruption. I concur “the logical sequence is to define social 
capital at the micro level, and then reach the macro level by aggregation.” 
(Paldam 2000: 631). However I acknowledge that it is likely that the causal 
relation between social capital and crime/corruption --as it is the case with other 
correlates of the concept—is recursive. What it is important is that there is a 
growing amount of empirical findings that supports the causal link between crime 
(Seligson 2000, Paras 2007) or corruption (Seligson 2002, Bailey and Parás 
2006) on social capital. Most of the work focuses on crime, however it is equally 
plausible that perceptions of corruption cause distrust in individuals, institutions 
and expected cooperative behavior (i.e. reciprocity). I test this hypothesis in my 
model. I also expect that crime will have a greater impact on interpersonal trust 
and corruption on institutional trust43. Institutional corruption empirically showed 
to be correlated to GDP and trust in institutions (Eve Parts 2003 – 25-26). 
We also find evidence that the relation to crime/corruption can be thought of as 
mutual causations dependent on the level of the analysis. With aggregate data 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Suggested to a degree by Paldam (2000). 
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we find studies that show that “associational networks have a negative and 
significant impact on property crimes across” (Buannano et. al. 2006). The 
reverse causality is used in studies using crime victimization data such as the 
work of the Saegert and Winkel (2004). They test to see if crime has a chilling 
effect or an energizing effect on social capital. While the former suggest that it 
contains or reduces participation, the later implies a building effect on individual’s 
participation in community organizations. Their research finds that crime has 
chilling effect on social participation. This is the thesis put forward by Field stating 
that social capital can have a large and multi-level effect: “Social capital can ... be 
seen as one factor among others that helps to influence the amount of criminal 
activity in a community.  It also seems to play a part in determining whether or 
not particular individuals turn to criminal behavior.  Nor is this simply a matter of 
how the community and its members behave; social capital can also shape the 
behavior of law enforcement agencies. Social capital may also have a bearing on 
people’s respect for law enforcement agencies ... And of course, this is a self-
reinforcing pattern.” (Field 2003: 61-2). This is crucial and brings us back to the 
discussion of the dark side of social capital as “social networks [can] change their 
nature if they are located in social contexts where organized crime is relevant. 
Here the perusal of a social network is just a necessary condition to enter the 
labour market rather than a deliberate choice” (Menella 2011, 1). This is what I 
believe is happening in some regions of Mexico in States like Michoacan, 
Durango, Sinaloa or Tamaulipas which have large presence of organized crime.  
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There are some empirical analysis that find a energizing effect, showing that 
increased violence and crime can be associated with increased political 
participation (Bateson 2009) a specific type of participation that is not always 
included under social capital. Two cases in Mexico serve to illustrate this type of 
effect: Marti and Sicilia both became important activists after each one lost a 
son/daughter to organized crime. The former is a businessman whose daughter 
was kidnapped and murdered and later he founded an NGO called S.O.S that 
aims at providing citizens observatory on issues of public safety44. The latter is a 
similar and more recent case of a public figure, in this case a well-known writer, 
whose son was also murdered; as a reaction he started a movement called 
Marcha por la Paz, that received such support and attentions that it has 
transformed into a formal dialogue between organizations of the society and the 
federal government and more recently was a invited witness in the proposal for a 
“law for victims”. I found none or little evidence that other types of participation or 
trust are directly and positively link to increase in crime or corruption to confirm 
this energizing effect.  
Most of the literature reviewed up to here in this section deals with the relation 
between crime and social capital. For corruption there are similar findings of a 
direct effect with evidence of the causal direction going both ways.  Some 
authors suggest that social capital can reduce corruption (Bjørnskov 2003) and 
others find that corruption erodes trust or participation (Morris and Klesner 2010 
and Bailey and Paras 2006). A direct (not inverse) effect between social capital 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 More information can be found in the organization’s website: http://www.mexicosos.com 
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an corruption can also be found in the literature because it is argued, that a 
decrease in trust or reciprocity creates a favorable environment for corrupting 
acts between individuals (Harris 2007). In my models I test the negative effect 
that corruption has on social capital. As with crime, the research has great 
variation on how the intervening variables are defined and operationalised. For 
my research I use two types of measures to explore the effect of crime and 
corruption; one has to do with perceptions of the magnitude of the problem and 
the other with direct victimization indicators. These are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Crime and corruption have additional burdens on democracy that have been 
explore elsewhere as they  “stalk constantly on the citizens of Latin America 
propagating fear and discrediting the instances of the State”  (Cordova and 
Seligson 2010, my translation); and also on democratic consolidation (Johnston 
2000). Additionally crime/corruption have important consequences on human 
capital (Buannano and Leonida 2005) and on economic growth (Haque and 
Kneller 2005, Ugur and Dasgupta 2011). Finally, and as depicted in Figure 2.6, 
the evidence suggests that at the individual level, crime and corruption are also 
linked feeding of each other (Chatterjee and Ray 2009). In the fourth chapter, in 
part of my analysis, I will treat these two problems as a system or a context to try 
to assess their impact. 
Since I define trust as “unguarded interaction”, perceptions of safety of an 
individual to its environment play a crucial role. It is under this concpetualization 
that fear is placed as an intervening variable between crime and social capital, 
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and significant impacts are expected especially form fear to the cognitive 
dimension.  While the iterature shows that fear is related to crime and violence, 
this does not imply that the direct link between crime/corruption disappears in the 
mediation of fear, but rather it means that it impacts in two ways: directly and 
trough fear (see Figure 2.6). Again we find evidence that the reverse causation is 
possible, in other word that trust and networks can reduce fear (e.g. Lenguas and 
Ruprah 2008). The increased use of urban-gated communities, as a response to 
an increasingly perceived dangerous environment, is an example that suggests 
changes in social cohesion and social controls (Smets 2005). 
Figure 2.6. Causal relation between crime, corruption,  
fear and social capital 
 
                                           
            
 
 
2.7. Measuring social capital 
As it has been discussed up to here, most authors agree that social capital 
is composed of three main components in two dimensions: trust, reciprocity and 
networks/participation.  However the measurement, importance and interaction of 
these components vary across scholars. Measuring social capital has been done 
as simple and general as assessing the level of interpersonal trust with one 
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general question or as complex and integral as the Saguaro-Harvard project on 
social capital, which includes more than 60 variables. Foley and Edwards (1999) 
conducted a review of thirty articles and found an equal number of authors that 
treat social capital as a dependent or as a determinant, an equal number of those 
that use cognitive or structural laden definitions and found that most used a 
normative use of the concept. This is just an example of the variety ways that a 
potentially large in scope concept can be treated empirically. For a complex 
concept such as social capital, operationalisation is key and potentially complex. 
After a comprehensive and detailed research that includes all sorts of cross 
sectional data at the individual and aggregate level, in Bowling Alone Putnam 
(2000) concludes that the stocks of social capital in the United States are 
decreasing.  Specifically responding to that claim, and after agreeing on the 
crucial importance of social capital, Ladd convincingly shows that Putnam maybe 
reaching an incorrect --I would label it inconclusive-- finding because of 
measurement problem due to selective and bias indicators of the concept. 
Putnam shows that membership in the Benevolent Elks is decreasing while Ladd 
(1996) claims that the United States is becoming a soccer nation.  Both are right; 
so the debate revolves around which measure is a better (i.e. more valid and/or 
relevant) indicator of social capital in order to properly assess its stocks. 
The answer may depend in part on the context. I have had the chance to take my 
kids to soccer practice in two very different soccer nations: the United States and 
Mexico.  I can say the following from my experience, the north appears to be 
better organized (has larger number of formal leagues) and more inclusive (it has 
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incorporated girls in greater degree to the practice of soccer); however in the 
south, the practice of soccer is of much more social relevance and the interaction 
around the activity could be of greater consequences to the stocks of social 
capital than in the United States.  In New England, for example, parents bring 
their kids, a cup of coffee, and something to read, while in Mexico after the game 
the different families get together to have lunch. Using soccer leagues as a proxy 
of social capital can then lead to unreliable and potentially wrong assessments. 
Additionally one cannot assess, as do Inglehart (World Value Survey) or Lagos 
(Latinobarometer), the levels of interpersonal trust of a given society by using the 
generalized trust indicator, a potentially unreliable single-item indicator45. 
Stone (2001) provides probably the most in depth and comprehensive review of 
how social capital has been measured.  Her work is a helpful classification tool 
when measuring the stocks of social capital of a given community, as she 
provides a criterion to define the scope and focus of empirical research on the 
subject.  As the author correctly points out, most of the earlier work was based 
on analysis of secondary data, and although primary data collection on the topic 
is growing, we are still in a developmental stage, often relying on measures of 
questionable quality and/or unlinked to theory.  She contends: “A theoretical 
informed approach to the measurement of social capital is essential to 
overcoming empirical confusion and enabling proper investigation of social 
capital as it relates to a range of outcomes”.  Three main recommendations for 
the research design can be identify in her work: (a) research should rely on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 A lengthy discussion about the shortcomings and problems of such approach was presented by 
the author at the 60th Annual Conference of the American Association of Public Opinion 
Research, at Miami FL, May 12-15, 2005 (co-authored with Luis Estrada). 
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multidimensional measurement of valid indicators of the three components of the 
concept; (b) it is helpful to distinguish between indicators and outcomes of social 
capital; and (c) it is useful to understand and operationalise social capital as ‘a 
resource to action’ (2001: 6, 34).   
The first recommendation is discussed in length in the third chapter. The second 
presents empirical challenges because it is much harder to measure indicators 
than outcomes.  Even if indicators prove to be better measurements of social 
capital as Stone suggest, such empirical approach could constraint the types and 
application of measurement techniques that can be used.  My position is that 
survey research is a technique best suited to measure attitudes and behavior 
(outcomes) than values, norms and culture (indicators).  In fact, it is often the 
case that researches trying to capture deeper indicators such as values or norms 
rely on outcomes or on perceptions of the norms, simply because they are easier 
to observe.  To avoid the tautological problem of finding social capital to be 
related to its measured outcome –a warning found in Stone’s work– we most 
clarify the kind and type of measurement we are using, but also make the a priori 
assumption that a norm, value or culture is a necessary condition of an outcome.  
In other words, outcomes of social capital are only possible if indicators are 
present.46 Finally the benefit of the third recommendation is that it guides our 
research by focusing on aspects that enable/disable cooperative behavior and 
productive resources for individuals.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Stone also differentiates between proximal and distal types of outcomes.  The later are 
measurements of outcomes that that are directly related to the three dimensions of social capital; 
the former measure them indirectly or are not liked directly to them (2001: 5).  It is clear that 
proximal indicators are better than distal for determining social capital. 
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As stated above I propose to use a neutral definition of social capital but 
subscribe to a normative approach based on this “resource to action” focus and 
considering the potential benefits that a healthy stocks of social capital can have 
on democracy and development as pointed out earlier. 
Regarding techniques, the assessments of social capital can be qualitative or 
quantitative. Regarding scope we can have partial or integral measures of the 
concept based on how many components are included in our measurements. 
Regarding depth we have different degrees of measures depending on the 
number of indicators uses to capture each component. And regarding focus can 
have network or cognitive laden approaches. While the later are usually 
concerned in providing a detail account of the quantity and type of relation that 
are available to an individual, the former concentrate more on attitudes of trust 
and reciprocity and could include proxies of networks such as membership 
and/or participation. 
For my research I use a quantitative approach because I am interested in 
analyzing how the stocks of social capital have evolved in time and more 
particularly how are this being impacted by crime and corruption. I rely both on 
ad-hoc and secondary analysis using public opinion research and conducting 
analysis ate the individual level but analyzing trends at the aggregate. I rely on 
an integral in depth scope as I include multi-indicators of the three components. 
Finally my approach can be classified as integral but somewhat cognitive laden. 
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The Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) developed by the World Bank47, 
recommends to have four basic requirements when assessing social capital 
empirically: (a) to have a flexible (allowing for context differences) single 
conceptual framework; (b) to capture both dimensions; (c) to measure activities 
that are collective in the context under study; and (d) use both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. My research covers the first three. Qualitative 
techniques can best capture the complexity entailed in the interaction of a group 
and that is the main reason supporting using both techniques: “Institutional 
mapping, focus groups, and other qualitative techniques provide a more nuanced 
understanding of institutional characteristics”. (Grootaert and Bastelaer 2002: 
22).  The survey instruments developed by SOCAT along with the Saguaro 
Project are two of the most influential measurement tools available that have 
been use comparatively. Some of my indicators are taken from these instruments 
but I also use or have been influenced by other important surveys such as the 
World Values Survey and the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt 
University (LAPOP). A detail discussion on operationalisation of variables in the 
research design is included in the following chapter.  
To the extend of possible, I have tried to consider the following recommendations 
form the World Bank as to the desirable properties of indicators:48 
1. Be developed within and agreed on conceptual and operational 
framework 
2. Be clearly defined and easy to understand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/490023-
1121114603600/13000_6_SOCAT.pdf  
48 Source: Grootaaert (1998) 
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3. Be subject to aggregation (from household to community, form community 
to nation) 
4. Be objective (be independent of the data collector) 
5. Have reasonable data requirements –either available data or data that 
can be collected at limited cost and within the capacity of the country’s 
statistical apparatus 
6. Have “ownership” by user 
7. Be limited in numbers 
8. Reflect input, process, or outcome 
 
Two final points are relevant in this section. The first one has to do with the need 
to use multiple and multi-item indicators of the components. As it was mentioned 
above in this chapter and because of the definition of each component, an 
integral measurement of social capital requires that we capture different aspects 
of each component and when need using multi-items. Take trust for example, it 
has several dimensions (interpersonal, institutional, familiar, etc.) and each of 
these is situational and requires that we try to capture it as a construct. My 
design takes this into account. The second point has to do with the fact that we 
have seen an increase number of surveys in Mexico that measure social capital 
as a whole or are interested in providing an in depth measure of a given (sub) 
component. Examples of this are The Urban Social Capital Survey (Sedesol 
2006), the National Surveys of Solidarity and Voluntary Actions of CEMEFI (2005 
and 2012), the National survey on Philanthropy of ITAM (2005 and 2008) and 
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several measurements of the components of social capital conducted by Data 
OPM49.  
 
2.8. Social capital in Mexico 
When comparing the 1990 and 2000 Mexican data of the World Value 
Survey, we find mixed evidence on social capital indicators.  While structural 
aspects have remained the same (networking), perceptions of personal health 
and happiness increased, indicators of interpersonal trust decreased 
significantly, however political participation has been on the rise for the last 15 
years.  
This suggests –as it was mentioned before-- that the concept of social capital 
includes multiple constructs (underlying dimensions or factors to use statistical 
terms) that exits simultaneous closely related and theoretically linked to some 
structural features.  Additionally it is important to mention that, coinciding with the 
transition to democracy, we have seen an increased social and political 
participation. A Putnam like indicator of this process is the number of 
associations of the civil society (OSC for their Spanish acronym) over time. 
According to Mexican Centre for Philanthropy (CEMEFI) there were 10,704 
formally constituted organization of the third sector in Mexico 2009. The number 
seems small for a country the size of Mexico; however according to CEMEFI 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The ENSAV (Encuesta Nacional sobre Solicdaridad y Acciones Voluntarias) has been 
conducted in 2005 and 2012 by the CEMEFI and cover in depth voluntary actions, a sub-account 
of social participation. The ENAFI, conducted by the ITAM, a private University, has capture in 
2005 and 2008 is a national survey on philanthropy and donations (it is expected to be replicated 
again in 2013). Data OPM is a private research firm founded by the author that specializes in 
social capital among other topics (www.dataopm.net) 
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there is a significant increase in the number association from 2,364 in 1995 and 
4,246 in 199950.  
The information presented in Table 2.1 is also puzzling and inconclusive. It 
covers a shorter and more recent period (from 2004 to 2012) using data form the 
Americas Barometer Survey in Mexico.  It shows that most indicators of structural 
and cognitive social capital have remain fairly stable over this period, with the 
exception of a larger participation in religious meetings, smaller participation in 
PTA and community improvement meetings and decrease trust in mass media. 
On the other hand we have evidence that crime and corruption have significantly 
increased, especially crime in the new millennium (figures presented and 
discussed in chapter 5). For example, according to the Trans-border Institute of 
the University of San Diego the number of executions in Mexico has risen from 
1,080 in 2001 to 8,281 in 2009. 
Does this means then that there is no relation between crime/corruption and 
social capital in Mexico? Not necessarily. As it was shown above the results on 
social capital literature are highly dependent on scope and operationalisation of 
indicators. It maybe the case that crime has an adverse effect on bridging but a 
different impact on bonding. There is data for Mexico that suggests that trust in 
family members is increasing while trust in persons outside the family circles is 
decreasing. Individuals may be reacting to an adverse environment by “turning-
inwards by closing-out”. An additional consideration when assessing the data 
may be that Mexico has already achieved such high levels of crime/corruption, 
especially on perception indicators, that most of the effect has already taken 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 For more information access: http://www.cemefi.org 
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place. That is why my model compares individuals with dissimilar characteristic in 
terms of experience and perceptions to test if these have an impact on their 
attitudes and behavior.  
Table 2.1: Selected participation and trust indicators for Mexico 2004 - 2012 
 
Participation Indicators 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Did not contribute in the 
solution of a community 
problem in the last 12 
months (%) 
- - 71.2 65.3 71.6 
Does not participate in 
religious meetings (%) 49.1 33.7 38.7 42.3 44.3 
Does not participate in PTA 
meetings (%) 56.0 55.1 59.6 7.9 65.3 
Does not participate in 
community improvement 
meetings (%) 
68.6 72.4 72.4 72.2 78.7 
Does not participate in 
political meetings (%) 86.3 86.6 86.9 83.8 89.6 
      
 
Trust Indicators 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
 
Very or somewhat trust in 
others (%) 
63.5 65.9 62.8 60.5 62.8 
Average trust in Justice 
System 50.2 50.5 50.8 48.1 49.0 
Average trust in Armed 
Forces 67.7 72.4 70.8 72.2 70.2 
Average trust in the Police 42.4 37.7 43.6 36.4 39.9 
Average trust in Political 
parties 41.5 43.0 41.5 35.4 39.5 
Average trust in Mass Media 66.0 67.1 63.0 60.4 59.7 
Average trust in the Catholic 
Church 72.1 72.6 70.2 70.4 69.0 
      
Source: Americas Barometer survey in Mexico conducted by Data OPM for the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University. 
 
One way to conclusively test if crime and corruption have a direct and negative 
impact on social capital at the individual level is to rely on an integral and 
comprehensive measurement of all of these constructs. I use the term construct 
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because most of the variables needed included in my research are non-directly 
observable phenomena and thus we have to use a multi-item measurements to 
construct them. It is also desirable to include all components of social capital (in 
an integral way) to be able to differentiate the effects between them. The main 
model to test my hypotheses has these characteristics and is described in length 
in the next chapter. 
A comprehensive and integral measure of the stocks of social capital in Mexico is 
pending work and beyond the scope of my research. 
 
2.9. Expected findings 
In this section I close the review of the literature on social capital by 
providing a brief summary of the chapter and introducing a general model of the 
expected findings.  
As it has been discussed in length, the concept of social capital consists of 
two dimensions-three components that had been studied by scholarly work 
before the term was invented. The three components are: trust, reciprocity and 
participation. The contribution of the concept is to join them together as a new 
kind of capital and to document their impact on many social phenomena. Social 
capital has been studied by several disciplines, with different analytical tools and 
in most cases focusing in one of the three components. There is a general 
consensus on two building blocks of the social capital theory: its components 
significantly affect behavior and institutional performance and are generally 
associated with well-being.  It has been generally treated from a normative 
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perspective but most authors concur that it can have negative effects; this has 
been label the ´dark side´ of social capital. It has been place in the family of 
capital because it possesses most of their characteristics. As it is the case with 
the other types of capital, it has a value per se even when it is not being used, in 
other words it has a latent state and it can deteriorate over time.  
Its beneficial impacts on democracy and development have been documented 
extensively. Its three components –trust, reciprocity and networks—are closely 
tied together in a recursive manner and trust is potentially the most important of 
the three; the tree are viewed as important factors on the main correlates of 
democracy. The literature showing the negative impact that crime and corruption 
have on social capital is also extensive. I have presented scholarly work that 
suggests a recursive relation between them and also between social capital an 
democracy/development. I acknowledge this mutual causation but will use a non-
recursive model to test my main hypothesis with the components of social capital 
as dependent variables. Figure 2.7 shows a general model that I will use for 
which all causal relation between variables have been discussed in this chapter 
and that cover the hypothesis presented in the first chapter. The research that 
supports this model includes multi-item constructs of the outcomes studied by 
Bourdieu (economic well-being), Putnam (democracy) and Coleman (human 
capital). Additional and more specific models will be presented in the next 
chapters. 
If social capital can have a positive impact on the quality of democracy --that can 
be of particular importance to a country in a developmental stage such as 
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Mexico—and the levels o crime and corruption in Mexico threatened to reduce 
trust, reciprocity and participation, it becomes important that we assess such 
impact. That is the content of the following chapters. 
 
Figure 2.7. General causal model of the research 
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Chapter III: Assessing the impact of  
crime and corruption on social capital 
 
Where social capital has been measured to date, it has often been done so using 
‘questionable measures’, often designed for other purposes, and without sufficient 
regard to the theoretical underpinnings of the concepts to ensure validity or reliability 
 
Wendy Stone 
 
 
3.1. Introduction to the research design 
Up to here I have provided a general introduction to my research by 
stating the main purpose of my inquiry and my intended analytical perspective.  I 
have also discussed the logic of causality found in the literature and discussed 
how perceptions impact attitudes and behavior. These constitute a first window 
into the operationalisation of my research. This chapter contains a description of 
the research design as well as of the principal source of data from which the 
hypotheses are tested. It also contains a discussion on operationalisation and 
measurement of the key constructs and the main statistical methods use to 
validate the data and confirm the hypothesis. 
My research design is greatly influenced by the words of Crespy: 
No, what has been found wanting is the way so much attitude research has been 
conducted with, on the one hand, reliance on attitude scales of an unwarranted 
high order of generality and abstraction and, on the other hand, theory that is 
overly particularized and concrete.  If we reverse this, so that measurements are 
highly particular and specific in their behavioral referents while our theory 
presents us with generalizable models, the goal of developing attitudinal 
measurements and theories that are predictive can be achieved. (1977: 294) 
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Even tough Crespy was writing about the topic of voting turnout, I believe his 
argument to be valid for many other social phenomenon.  He is referring to the 
quality of measurement and research design (general and abstract measurement 
of attitudes) to decrease the probability of committing a type I (finding a non 
significant relation between two variables that are causally related) or type II error 
(finding significant causal relation between variables where none really exist).  
My research design is greatly concerned about the quality of measurement and 
that is why I use items that are behavioral referents of specific situations to 
capture the concepts that interest me. Because the relevant concepts to my 
analysis are of complex nature, most of them are measured using two or more 
items (i.e observed variables). In a single item measurement “all of the 
measurement eggs of a theoretical variable are placed in one basket of its single 
observed measure” (Kline 1998). This is precisely what I tried to avoid. From 
here on, such multi-item measurement of concepts will be referred 
interchangeably as constructs or latent variables.  The validity and reliability of 
each construct is assessed using confirmatory factor analysis and discussed 
later in this chapter51.  
My main goal is to explore the complexity of the issue at hand using a Structural 
Equation Model (SEM) as my main statistical tool.  In SEM a variable can be 
impacted by one or many variables but it can also impact others.  Thus, SEM 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Reliability refers to measurements performing consistently overtime, that is “... yield the same 
result on repeated trials” and have a “tendency toward consistency”. Validity means that the 
question “measures what it purports to measure” (Carmines and Zeller 1979: 11 and 12). There 
are different types of validity, the most common are: criterion, content, construct, convergent and 
discriminant. The CFA is a test to partially assess content, convergent and discriminant validity 
(Kline 1998: 60). For a detail discussion on reliability and validity see Carmines and Zaller. 
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allows me to measure direct and indirect effects, and to show a multiple 
interaction relation between variables.  SEM also allows the use of the multi-item 
constructs specifically constructed to test the entire hypotheses. The 
measurement model, that is the causal relation between variables, is set 
according to the theory discussed in the previous chapter: details of the model 
are provided later in this chapter. The constructs included in the SEM can be 
grouped into the following categories: demographics anchors, contextual 
variables (experience and perceptions of crime and corruption), dimensions of 
social capital (cognitive and structural), and democratic attitudes (human capital, 
civic engagement and satisfaction with democracy).  The most relevant causal 
relation for my thesis is the impact of the contextual variables on the dimensions 
of social capital; however with the full model we are able to place the research in 
a larger perspective and assess the interaction on other relevant indicators as 
well as explore differences by key demographic segments. 
 
3.2. Data description 
The following paragraphs provide details on the specifics of my research 
design and introduce the principal source of data for my analysis52. The social 
systems under study are Mexico City and the state of Guanajuato.  While the 
former constitutes a high-crime, high-corruption context, the latter entails the 
opposite.  The inclusion and analysis of these two different social systems is a 
useful control mechanism that allows me to compare and discuss the findings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 A brief footnote will be included when other sources of data are used to complement the 
analysis and discussion. 
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and their implications in greater depth. Since the exact same questionnaire was 
used in both cities, the analysis could also have conducting combining both 
samples and this in turn would have increase the statistical power (i.e. N size or 
number of interviews) of the analysis. However, we have enough sample size on 
each city and group comparison is done by design to test if perceptions, attitudes 
and behaviors are independent of context or not. It also serves as a simple 
replication of the hypothesized model of interaction and since my level of 
analysis is set at the individual differences I am interested in testing if the same 
pattern of interaction between variables occur in different settings. I am 
interested to describe, explain (and prescribe if possible) how the impact of 
experiences and perceptions differ according to the characteristics of individuals 
including their context. Finally since the two surveys were conducted in different 
days we may encounter exogenous effects if we pooled the two surveys 
together. 
The data used to test the impact of crime and corruption on social capital comes 
from two independent cross-sectional surveys.  The first one was conducted in 
September 2004 to a representative sample of the adult population (i.e. 18 years 
of older) of Mexico’s capital, the Federal District (D.F.).  The D.F. accounts for 
roughly 40% of the total population of the metropolitan area of Mexico City and it 
is the country’s political and financial center. The second was conducted in 
March 2005 and is a statewide representative sample of adults living in the state 
of Guanajuato located northwest of Mexico City (see Figure 3.1 for a geographic 
reference). The sample size for the D.F. survey is 994 cases and the results 
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have an expected margin of error of +/- 3.2% at a 95% confidence level.  For 
Guanajuato a total of 1200 interviews were conducted with an expected margin 
of error of +/- 2.9% at the same confidence level.   
It is important to note that the survey results speak of the particular situation of 
2004 and 2005 and that the context, of crime specially, has dramatically change 
for the worse after president Calderon’s government took office in 2006 and 
decided to directly confront organized crime with the use of the army in some 
states of the country53. Even though the army has not been directly used in the 
D.F. and Guanajuato recent survey data shows that the incidence and 
perceptions of crime have significantly increased54.  
The questionnaire used in both surveys was specifically design to test the 
hypotheses presented in chapter one and to be able to run the statistical analysis 
presented in the previous section. As stated, each construct relevant to the 
research was measured with two or more items or questionnaire variables.  For 
example five items were used to measure the construct named FEAR: fear at 
home, at work, in the streets, in public spheres and driving/using public 
transportation.  The exact wording of the questions can be found in Annex 1 were 
I show for every construct the exact wording of the questions and document any 
transformation made on items for the analysis.  Many of the questions were 
borrow from other surveys such as the World Value Survey; several other, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 For a discussion of the magnitude of the problem and the use and trust of the army to fight 
crime see Bailey, Paras and Vargas (2013 forthcoming). 
54 For national and statewide victimization surveys and data on crime see the ICESI’s and 
INEGIS web site http://www.icesi.org.mx and INEGI’s: http://www.inegi.org.mx. For historical data 
on corruption see the national survey of corruption and good government conducted by the 
Mexican chapter of Transparency International in the following website: http://www.tm.org.mx 
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however, were writing specifically to measure the variables of interest to the 
present research.  
 
Figure 3.1: Map of Mexico City and Guanajuato 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Measurement of the key constructs 
 The main thesis of the research is that an adverse context of crime and 
corruption —constituted by experiences and perceptions of individuals—will 
decrease the levels of social capital. To confirm it in an integral way, we need 
robust measurements of at least the following aspects of these complex issues: 
experiences with crime and corruption, perceptions of crime and corruption, 
institutional trust, personal trust, reciprocity, and formal and informal participation.  
Additionally and since we are interested in testing a specific causality (crime and 
corruption decreasing social capital), we rely on demographic anchors and 
because these are intrinsic to individuals we are certain that they are not caused 
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by the other variables in the model. Therefore they are placed as independent 
variables and partially served to confirm the hypothesized causality. Additionally 
we are interested to test if other political costs of crime and corruption exist. To 
test this we include additional measurements of the following key constructs that 
speak to the quality of a democracy: satisfaction with democracy, civic 
engagement and human capital. Except for the demographic anchors and for the 
variable of “satisfaction with democracy”, each construct is measured using two 
or more items and most or confirmed an observed construct. Each item 
represents a survey question. 
A total of 65 items in 13 different latent factors are used in the confirmatory factor 
analysis, and the principal SEM model reflects the use of a total of 69 measured 
items or questionnaire variables. Table 3.1 presents the demographic variables 
and latent variables used in the SEM model as well as the number of items used 
to measure each construct. 
Before proceeding to conduct the required factor analysis to confirm that each 
item belongs in the specified construct, we conducted a careful screening of the 
Data. Such screening is seen here as a step in the control of the quality of the 
information gathered.  The process includes the six types of screening 
recommended by Kline (2004) that we briefly describe here.  Each variable was 
screened for missing data and non-response.  Very few variables had a non-
response rate higher than ten percent. Non-response was treated with the 
imputation method, which is the replacement of the non-response value for an 
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intermediate value defined by the scale of each item, such modifications can be 
found in the last column of Annex 1.   
Table 3.1. Variables and constructs use in the analysis 
 
Concept 
 
Variable/Construct 
 
No. of 
items used 
 
Demographic 
anchors 
 
Gender 
Age 
Education 
Socio economic level 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Social Capital 
 
Cognitive 
    (1) Institutional trust 
    (2) Personal trust 
    (3) Reciprocity 
 
Structural 
     (4) Formal participation 
     (5) Informal participation 
 
 
10 
5 
3 
 
 
8 
2 
 
Quality of 
democracy 
 
Democratic attitudes 
     (6) Satisfaction with democracy 
     (7) Civic Engagement 
 
(8) Human capital 
 
 
1 
5 
 
6 
 
Crime context 
 
(9) Experience 
(10) Perception 
 
(11) Fear – personal safety 
 
4 
5 
 
6 
 
Corruption 
context 
 
(12) Experience 
(13) Perception 
 
 
5 
5 
 
  
Total = 13 constructs and 4 
demographic anchors 
 
 
Total = 69 
items 
 
 
A pair-wise correlation matrix was analyzed to detect potential problems of 
redundancy (multicollinearity) a test that is later reconfirmed in the confirmatory 
factor analysis.  Since most of the variables are categorical and use a five-point 
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likert-type scale (e.g. a lot, some, little, none), there aren’t any problems with 
outliers.  The variables were also tested for normality (e.g. if they present a 
normal distribution) running the test for skewness and kurtosis.  Normal 
distribution is a key requirement for SEM models, especially of endogenous 
variables.  The majority of the items (84%) were found to have an accepted value 
between -2 and 2 in the test of skewness and kurtosis.  Since the items will 
eventually become construct and/or indexes a similar test of skewness and 
kurtosis was performed on these to ensure that the assumption of normality is 
met.  Finally an assumption of linear relations between factors is to be placed 
upon the data when we run the structural equation model. 
 
3.4. Confirmatory factor analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed on each construct 
using a DOS base program developed by Mark Hamilton and John Hunter in 
1988. Based on theory each item was set to be part of a single unobserved 
construct or latent factor.  This is a key difference between CFA and the most 
widely used EFA (Exploratory Factor Analysis).  While the former assumes a 
correspondence of measurement between an item and an unobserved and 
theorized construct, the latter explores relations between items to come up with 
rather subjective constructs.  In other words, the operationalisation of measures 
in the survey was conducted after a careful understanding of concepts needed to 
test my hypothesis.  It is also important to note that while CFA is conclusive (i.e. 
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confirmatory) exploratory factor analysis is not. Such confirmation includes 
several statistical tests to assess the reliability and validity of each construct.   
The most widely known test is Cronbach’s Alpha, a test of the internal 
consistency/reliability of the items; in other word if the items are indeed measures 
of the same construct.  Cronbach’s alpha is a conservative test that is highly 
sensitive to the number of items per factor as well as the inter-item correlation 
(Kline 2004: 45).  Table 3.2 shows the alpha coefficient from the CFA analysis.  
Most of the construct show an acceptable alpha coefficient of .65 or greater.  
Lower values are highlighted in bold; the items used to measure reciprocity have 
a low internal consistency and the ones for perceptions of corruption and 
perceptions of crime in Guanajuato have a moderate consistency.  In the case of 
reciprocity I do believe we need to use better items and have a more precise 
definition of this hard to grasp concept.  I believe the moderate alpha in the case 
of perceptions is more the reflection of the potentially large number of issues 
needed to better capture such complex construct.  All of the constructs are kept 
in the SEM for three reasons: (1) they are uni-dimensional as they do not load 
into any other factor; (2) they perform well in tests of external consistency when 
we explore their expected sign and magnitude of correlation to other factors; and 
(3) it is theoretically reasonable to group them together to constructed indexes or 
run second order factor analysis or models. Factor loadings of each item 
included in the measurement of constructs can be found in Annex 2. 
Of greater significance is the fact that my measurements and assessment of 
constructs (internal consistency and external validity) performed consistently and 
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equally well in both groups.  This finding should be interpreted as a test of 
replicability of measurement and it implies that the instrument  —the proposed 
multi-item measurement of unobserved factors—is consistent across-groups.  
While this may not be viewed as conclusive evidence of the general applicability 
of the measurement across-groups or across-cultures it is certainly a modest but 
strong argument about such possibility. 
 
Table 3.2. Reliability of constructs.  
Test of internal consistency by social system 
 Cronbach´s Alpha 
Construct D.F. Guanajuato 
 Institutional trust .834 .829 
Personal trust .683 .729 
Reciprocity .345 .280 
Formal Participation .731 .680 
Informal participation .704 .674 
Civic engagement .767 .853 
Human capital .760 .808 
Fear – personal safety .772 .838 
Experience crime .651 .669 
Perception of crime .543 .470 
Experience corruption .743 .774 
Perception of corruption .360 .448 
 
The above description of the CFA analysis should be taken as an internal 
consistency method of assessing reliability55. “Theoretically, interest lies in the 
underlying unobservable (and directly unmeasurable) concept that is presented 
by the response.” (Carmines and Zeller 1979: 10).  It follows that inferences 
should be made only after assessing the relation between observable response 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 According to Carmines and Zeller (1979) there are four methods of reliabity estimation: test-
retest, alternative-form, split-half and internal consistency. 
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and unobservable concept.  Otherwise –if the measurement is weak or wrong—
we increase the probability of committing a type II error.  I do not intend to have 
perfect measures but rather to contribute to the discussion of better 
measurement and higher standards for research design. 
 
3.5. Structural equation modeling 
Once we have confirmed that items are indeed observations of the 
proposed latent construct we can precede to test the hypothesized causal 
relation. SEM models allows us to use observed and unobserved variables 
simultaneously, such model are called hybrid models and represent the 
interaction between factors or between factor and observed variables.  The 
literature suggests that there should be 20 observations per item in a model.  If 
we decided to use the 69 items (4 observed demographic variables and the 12 
unobserved latent constructs from the 65 items tested in the CFA) we would 
need a sample size of 1380 interviews in each social system (i.e. in D.F. and 
Guanajuato)56.  Since we do not have enough cases for either group and in order 
to have a more parsimonious model it was decided to generate indexes for each 
factor by simply adding the responses of the items of each construct57.  By doing 
these I will treat them as observed multi-item indexes rather than unobserved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 My research presents a very complex model with a great number of variables. SEM is more 
often used in other disciplines such as communication science or psychology were the models 
tested include fewer variables. According to Kline a sample of 200 cases is usually considered 
large (Kline 1998: 12). 
57 Some authors state that it is possible to run models with a 10:1 ratio (See Elordi 2005 and Kline 
1998). Under such specification I would have enough cases to analyze the 69 variables in the 
model. Since SEM models using latent factors instead of indexes were tested because they yield 
similar results, it was decided to use an SEM model with indexes to simplify the model and 
discussions of results. 
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latent factors. However, as it was stated above, a careful validation of each 
construct was conducted prior to transforming it into an index. 
Several SEM models with fewer constructs were tested before settling on a 
starting parsimonious model. “The goal … of model building is to find a 
parsimonious model that also fits the data reasonably well” (Kline 1998: 148); in 
other words, a model that is as simple as possible but that it is able to test the 
research hypothesis.  Each tested model performed well and reported significant 
relation between variables in the expected directions. Since the findings are 
consistent with the ones in the parsimonious model they are not included here. 
SEM models that do not contain unobserved variables (i.e. factors) and that do 
not have mutual causation between variables are called structural non-recursive 
models.  The SEM model tested and discussed in the following lines is an 
example of such models.   It is possible that by eliminating the use of factors I will 
lose some statistical power, hence the effects between variables maybe 
conservative.  Additionally I will not be able to completely ‘unpack’ all of the 
effects at the item level but will do so at the construct level.  Before running the 
SEM parsimonious model the test of skewness and kurtosis was performed on 
the indexes to confirm normality in their distribution.  Table 3.3. shows the result 
of these tests by group. In the table we observe that all of the indexes can be 
assumed to have acceptable normal distribution except for formal participation.  
Once again the consistency between groups is remarkable.  This confirmation of 
normality allows me to run a SEM model using a maximum likelihood calculation. 
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The main goal of SEM analysis is “to understand patterns of correlations among 
a set of variables, and to explain as much of their variance as possible with the 
model specified by the researcher.” (Kline 1998: 10-11)  In fact, common 
statistical procedures such as regression and factor analysis are specific cases 
of SEM (Kline 1998: 8). The SEM proposed here can be viewed as a set of 
concurrent regressions which I believe constitutes a more precise description of 
relations between variables hence a more powerful statistical tool in areas of 
studies such as political science. Additionally and unlike regression, SEM models 
can handle latent variables and allow for correlation between residuals. Finally, 
an additional virtue of SEM is the ability to analyze nested models, something 
that cannot be done with regressions58.  
 
Table 3.3. Test of Kurtosis and Skewness  
on indexes by group 
Construct D.F. / N = 994 Guanajuato / N = 1200 
 Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis Skewness 
 
Institutional trust 
 
0.085 
 
0.713 
 
-0.314 
 
0.406 
Personal trust -0.747 -0.152 -0.476 -0.545 
Reciprocity -0.257 -0.174 -0.077 -0.350 
Formal Participation 5.043 2.056 4.917 1.955 
Informal participation -1.245 -0.024 -1.224 0.004 
Civic engagement -0.998 0.535 1.574 1.664 
Human capital -0.508 -0.663 -0.390 -0.787 
Fear – personal safety -0.602 -0.065 -0.539 0.515 
Experience crime -0.376 0.692 1.940 1.589 
Perception of crime -0.866 0.103 -0.471 0.333 
Experience corruption -0.751 -0.361 -0.475 -0.182 
Perception of corruption -0.396 -0.550 -0.747 -0.182 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Nested models are models related to each other where one is the extension of the other. 
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My approach can be classified as model generating which aims at discovering a 
model that is theoretical sound and empirically fitting. It is not strictly confirmatory 
nor a testing alternative models technique (Kline 1998: 9).  I start with a 
hypothesized model and test if the data fits it, however I will make further 
modifications to the model to improve fit and thus fully explore undefined 
relations between variables.  My main task is to provide evidence of the presence 
and magnitude of the political cost of crime and corruption under study here. To 
do so I will be primarily interested in determining if the effect size are statistically 
significant, and not so much on the size of that effect size. In other words my 
main concern is to determine which causal relations exists based on whether 
they are statistically significant or not. 
 
3.6. The general measurement model 
 In order to explore the impact of crime and corruption on social capital and 
democracy, six specific hypotheses were presented in the first chapter. Figure 
3.2 presents the causal model of these hypotheses supported by the literature 
discussed in the previous chapter. This general model specifies that and adverse 
context of crime and corruption —formed by experiences and perceptions of 
individuals— will negatively impact both the cognitive and structural dimensions 
of social capital as well as other indicators of the quality of democracy. The 
model also shows that the condition of living in fear acts as a moderating variable 
between the adverse context of crime and corruption and social capital and the 
indicators of quality of democracy. Hence the adverse context will directly and 
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indirectly (through fear) affect social capital and democracy. Fear is included as a 
separate variable not included in the context because individuals react differently 
to their specific environment; it is in this sense that it is hypothesized that the 
condition of living in fear is somewhat dependent on personal experiences and 
perception. 
With the exception of ´fear´, all of the boxes in Figure 3.2 contain more than one 
index. For example the cognitive dimension of social capital contains three 
indexes that capture three different constructs: personal trust, institutional trust 
and reciprocity. This makes the model more complex because each construct 
within a box acts a separate variable in the model and so a line for each causal 
relation has to be established. Each line in the model is a hypothesized link that 
will be tested when we run the SEM to confirm if it is significant or not. 
Figure 3.2: General measurement model:  
Hypothesized causality of the structural equation model 
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Figure 3.3 shows the model with full specifications for causal relation between 
the thirteen indexes that are briefly describe here.  Perceptions of crime and 
corruption both impact fear; they also determine the indexes of both dimensions 
of social capital and the indexes of quality of democracy. Hence there are nine 
lines coming out of each of the boxes of perception indicating that it is thought 
that they are determinants of these other variables. Experiencing crime only 
impacts fear and the cognitive aspects of social capital. Experiencing corruption 
determines fear and the structural aspects of social capital. Comparatively 
speaking, the model gives greater relevance to perceptions than to experiences 
(nine to three links respectively) and that is why we speak of The Power of 
Perceptions. The incidence of direct experience (i.e. condition of being a victim 
of) with crime and corruption is potentially lower than the perception of the 
existence of these problems or the view that they constitute something that is 
currently affecting or can affect the individual in the future. In other words, while 
experiences of crime and corruption only occur in a small percentage of the 
population, perceptions are present in all individuals. If these perceptions are 
adverse –caused by a real adverse context and experiences or not—they can 
have a significant and large effect on how people behave and relate to each 
other. 
The model also shows that ´fear´ impacts all of the dependent variables on the 
right except institutional trust. No causal assumption is made on demographic 
anchors that are placed in the model as exogenous variables. Once we run the 
model the data will guide us as to which links should be included from these 
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demographic anchors to other variables in the model59. None of the demographic 
anchors can be caused by any other variable in the model, if this is supported 
empirically in the data it can be taken as partial confirmation of the hypothesized 
model.  
Figure 3.3. Starting model with full  
specification of hypothesized causal relations
 
 
 
We also have not placed any causal linkage between the dependent variables 
found in the cognitive or structural dimensions of social capital nor on the 
indicators of the quality of democracy. It is expected that single or bidirectional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For reasons of simplicity the demographic anchors are not depicted in Figure 3.3. 
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relation may exit between some of these variables as suggested in chapter two. 
We did not include them because we are mainly interested in how key aspects 
for democracy such as social capital are being affected by an adverse context of 
crime and corruption. However once we run the SEM the program will indicate us 
if we should ´draw´ additional casual linkages between these variable in order to 
obtain a better fit for the model. Results of this complex model of interaction are 
presented in discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter IV: The Political Cost of Crime and Corruption 
 
We are not talking here simply about nostalgia for the 1950s. School performance, public 
health, crime rates, clinical depression, tax compliance, philanthropy, race relations, 
community development, census returns, teen suicide, economic productivity, campaign 
finance, even simple human happiness -- all are demonstrably affected by how (and 
whether) we connect with our family and friends and neighbors and co-workers  
 
Robert Putnam 
 
The above quote from Putnam is a summary of the power of social capital 
that was discussed in length in the second chapter. While the concept has been 
measured —partially or integrally—in many different ways it is commonplace to 
find that social capital is correlated positively to many social phenomena. In a 
nutshell: social capital is good for a society because it means that individuals 
who posses it (i.e. trust each other and participate) have desirable civic virtues 
and conform a cohesive and strong society. In the second chapter we also 
discussed the issue of the direction of causality: whether it is crime and 
corruption affecting stocks of social capital or whether it is the opposite. We 
concluded that it is likely to be a circular causation in which in one hand, an 
adverse context of crime and corruption negatively impacts the stocks of social 
capital and in the other healthy stocks of social capital can prevent crime and 
corruption. Because we are interested in the political costs of crime and 
corruption, the model used for my research —presented in the previous 
chapter—is an example of the former, however the data can be used to test 
reverse directionality and/or circular causation between crime/corruption and 
social capital. 
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Of greater importance is a recent debate found in the literature that discusses the 
issue of the sign of the relation. While earlier research had showed that crime 
and corruption diminishes social capital (Paras 2007, Seligson and Both 2009) 
more recent studies are finding that the opposite may be happening (Bateson 
2009). This dilemma, discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, is still 
unresolved and it may have to do with three things: the magnitude of crime and 
corruption at the time of the study and the responses from government and civil 
society to these problems and the research design and indicators used in the 
analysis. It is important to mention that most of the research looking into this 
causal relation focuses only on parts of it, for example establishing the relation 
between victimization and formal participation.  The model of interaction 
presented in the last chapter (Figure 3.3) constitutes an integral approach where 
all dimensions and components of social capital are included and where 
problems such as crime or corruption are measured both as experiences and 
perceptions. To my knowledge there is not a research of such robustness found 
in the literature. 
This chapter presents the finding of the research divided into three parts. On the 
first we discuses whether or not the hypothesized parsimonious model is 
empirically supported by the data. This is crucial to support the arguments of 
causality presented so far, the sign of the relation (i.e. positive or negative effect) 
and the effect size between crime/corruption and social capital. In the second 
part we focuses exclusively on the findings of the part of the model that explores 
this relation and on the third we discussed additional significant relations found 
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elsewhere in the model. All of the SEM results presented here were conducted 
using AMOS software version 4.0.60  
 
4.1. Does the data support the measurement model? 
Kline (1998) proposes a six-step process to test a hypothesized model. 
The first one is to specify the model, in other words to draw or describe the 
equations that show causal relations between variables or constructs. This was 
done in the last part of chapter three were we discussed and illustrated the 
parsimonious model that represents our hypothesis. The second step consist of 
determining if the model is identified or not, that is “if it is theoretically possible for 
the computer to derive a unique estimate of every model parameter” (Kline 1998: 
49). There are specific procedures to do this that have to do with the number of 
variables and causal links in the model as well as degrees of freedom and 
number of cases. Identification of the model is not discussed here because it is a 
requirement of AMOS software in order to run any model. In other words, a 
successful run of an SEM in AMOS is confirmation that the model is identified. 
The third step proposed by Kline is to collect the data. An in depth discussion of 
data source and data screening was presented in the previous chapter. It is 
important to note that the first versions of the hypothesized model were drawn 
before the generation of data. Therefore the questionnaire and sample design 
responded to the research agenda and not the other way around. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Today AMOS is a model of the software SPSS. At the time my analysis was conducted AMOS 
was an independent stand-alone software. 
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Once the data is collected the next two processes are conducted using the 
specialized SEM software. The first one is the estimation of parameters within 
the model. Such estimations constitute the findings and show both the 
significance and magnitude of relations between variables. As it was suggested 
in the previous chapter we used a Maximum likelihood estimation because it 
“works just fine for most types of structural equation models so long as the data 
have been properly screened an their distributions are reasonably normal” (Kilne 
1994: 145). Secondly we need to evaluate the fit of the model, a crucial step that 
defines if the model is confirmed empirically or not.  In this step we conclude if 
the data supports the hypotheses drawn in the model or not. It is important to 
note that such confirmation means only that such model is possible and 
supported empirically by the data. It is not by any mean confirmation that this is 
neither the only model nor the best model. Additionally it is important to mention, 
that this entails only partial (not final) confirmation of causality. The final step in 
the six-step process is to conduct, if needed, a respecification of the model. If a 
respecification of the model is conducted, the first five steps need to be done 
again. Before presenting the major findings, the following lines provide in depth 
discussions of the model fit and respecifications that were conducted. 
 
4.1.1. Confirmation of the general model of interaction  
The main task of the SEM analysis is to accept or reject the model based 
on the fit of the data.  This is confirmation that the variables relate causally to 
each other in the way it was expected/hypothesized.  It is important to mention 
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that evaluation of the whole model has precedence over the impact between 
variables (Kline 1998: 13); thus the principal goal is to accept or reject the model.  
The final model from where I discuss the findings in the next section is achieved 
after two respecifications. The discussion of the fit of model that follows is based 
on the final model61. To accomplish confirmation of the model we need to look at 
the fit estimates of the model. There are several fit estimations available in most 
SEM software programs. Table 4.1 shows four alternative fit measures for three 
models: the starting original model, and the ones achieved after one and two 
respecifications. A description of these respecifications is found later and its 
documentation can be found in Annex 3.   
The first fit measure is the Chi-square that shows the degrees of freedom of the 
model and its p value.  This test is highly sensible to sample size and it is not 
relevant for studies of 200 cases or more.  It is presented mainly to show the 
degrees of freedom of the models as well as the achieved improvement after 
each respecifications.  The other three measures are the ones used here to 
determine if the model is accepted or rejected.  The value of the Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) test should be above 0.90 to be acceptable and is it considered of 
good if it is higher than 0.95.  The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) is expected 
to be below 0.05 with the lower bound approaching cero and the upper bound not 
higher than 0.10.  The third criterion is provided by the Hoelter .05 index which is 
expected to produce a number higher than 280 for the model to be considerer of 
good fit.  These are the most commonly used fit measures and the ones 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The original as well as the first respecified model were also confirmed by their respective fit 
estimates. 
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appropriate for the type of model under analysis. Additional measures include the 
Chi Square to degrees of freedom Ratio, the Bentler-Bonett Index or Normed Fit 
Index, Tucker Lewis Index or Non-normed Fit Index, p of Close Fit, Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residua, Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian 
Information Criterion (see Kenny 2012 for a description and discussion of fit 
measures).  
As the table 4.1 demonstrates both groups present a good fit, thus the general 
model of causation is accepted in both the D.F. and Guanajuato.  The CFI was 
lower than the accepted standard in the original model but in the final (after the 
second respecification) an acceptable fit was achieved in D.F. and a good fit for 
Guanajuato. A similar thing happens when we evaluate the fit according to 
RMSEA and as it is shown both in D.F. and Guanajuato we have a good fit 
according to this indicator. Finally if we evaluate the Hoelter .05 index, we see 
very good fits in both groups after the first respecification.  This is conclusive 
evidence that the hypothesized causal relation is confirmed empirically by the 
data.  In other words, the data confirms that it is possible that perceptions of 
crime and corruption impact social capital in the hypothesized way.  This is not 
conclusive evidence of causality and does not constitute the only available 
relational model available for this specific set of variables.  This means that other 
causal relation between variables –including some with reverse or circular 
causation—can also fit the data. 
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Respecification of the models was conducted with an empirical test62 method 
following three criteria supported in the literature: they were based on theoretical 
rationale; a causal link was eliminated if found to be statistically insignificant; or 
added a casual link for relations between variables with high modifications 
indexes that lead to a significant causal link. Both the first and either the second 
or third criteria were needed in order to make respecifications to the original 
model. It is important to note that the respecifications for D.F. and Guanajuato 
are slightly different which means that group moderates the model. However final 
models group do not vary greatly; the differences are discusses later in the 
chapter. 
 
Table 4.1. Measures of model fit by group 
    
D.F. 
 Model 
Measure of fit Original Respecification 1 Respecification 2 
Chi square (DF), p 766,951 (97), 
<0.001 
419.150 (98), 
<0.001 
250.142 (87), 
<0.001 CFI 0.619 0.817 0.907 
RMSEA (lower / 
upper) 
0.083 (0.078 / 
0.089) 
0.057 (0.052 / 
0.063) 
0.043 (0.037 / 
0.050) Hoelter .05 index 157 290 436 
    
GUANAJUATO 
 Model 
Measure of fit Original Respecification 1 Respecification 2 
Chi square (DF), p 1008.407 (97), 
<0.001 
315.470 (90), 
<0.001 
205.881 (86), 
<0.001 CFI 0.574 0.911 0.952 
RMSEA (lower / 
upper) 
0.089 (0.084 / 
0.094) 
0.046 (0.040 / 
0.051) 
0.034 (0.028 / 
0.040) Hoelter .05 index 144 431 633 
    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 According to Kenny there are two general methods to respecify a model: (a) a priori looking at 
potential modifications or simplifications of the model form a theoretical perspective; and (b) and 
through the use of empirically test in the data (2010). 
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As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the demographic anchors were not 
defined in the original model; however it was expected that each of these four 
demographic variables would impact other variables in the model. Most of the 
respecifications are of this type; that is casual links between demographic 
anchors and substantive variables. Demographic variables are only allowed to 
function as exogenous or anchors in the model, in other words they can only be 
independent variables. For the D.F. a total of eight links between a demographic 
anchor and a substantive variable were added in the first respecification and six 
in the second. For Guanajuato we have 12 and 4 respectively.  Additionally in 
both groups there were several added links from experience of crime and 
corruption to other substantive variables (three in D.F. and six in Guanajuato), 
which means that experience of crime and corruption are more powerful than 
originally expected. Information on added or deleted links is presented in Table 
4.3 and Annex 3. Specific results are discussed below.  
 
4.1.2. Confirmation of causality between variables 
 Now that we have confirmed the general model of interaction we need to 
assess if we met the requirements to confirm causality between variables. A first 
step is to assess three criteria in order to infer causality form correlations: time 
precedence, correctly specified causation and control for other variables (see 
Kline 1998: chapter 5). My measurement of variables is concurrent (i.e. obtained 
in the same measurement instrument), so technically speaking I cannot 
demonstrate time precedence. However admission by a respondent of being a 
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victim or having participated in corruption measure past events and the rest (e.g. 
interpersonal or institutional trust) reflect the opinion of the interviewee on the 
day of the interview. Hence theoretically speaking there is room to make the 
argument for time precedence63. This substantive rationale way to argue 
causation and precedence is complemented by Seligson and Booth (2009). They 
argue that victims of crime and corruption are not selected by criminals 
depending on their levels of participation or trust. In other words the more trusting 
or participating individuals are equally likely to be victims of crime and corruption 
that individuals with lower levels of participation and trust; selections of victims is 
independent of current levels of social capital of the victim.  
The second thing needed to infer causality from correlation is to have a correct 
specification of causation. In other words to correctly draw lines in the model 
form causing variables to caused variables. This refers to the issue of 
directionality discussed in chapter two were we stated that (a) it is possible that 
the relation between crime/corruption and social capital is reverse or circular; and 
(b) form a theoretical point of view it holds that levels of social capital can be 
reduced by crime and corruption. The third aspect, control for other variables, 
assures that relation between variables holds when we partial out (i.e. control for) 
the effect of other variables. This is achieved in regression analysis and in SEM 
models as the one presented here where the other variables in the model control 
the effect of each independent or causing variables. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 However I do think, as it is suggested by the diagram of the impact of perception on attitudes 
discussed in chapter one, that there is reciprocal causation.  For example becoming a victim in 
time 1 may cause an individual to become less trustful of others in time 2 and this in exchange 
can make this individual less likely to become a victim in future times. 
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Additional to this assessment of causality form correlation and as a way to 
conclusively determine causality, we could do further experiments, have accurate 
predictions or replicate the model across independent samples. The scope of my 
research does not include any follow up survey or additional experiments. It is 
also impossible to determine if predicted causations were accurate or not; this 
would be a criterion type of validation rarely achieved in the area of political 
science. However, since my research is by design a comparison between groups 
--in my case independent samples in the D.F. and Guanajuato-- and because 
they were conducted at different times (2004 and 2005 respectively), this can be 
viewed as evidence of a successful replication of the causal model. Such 
replication contributes to the robustness of the results and is seen here as partial 
confirmation of causality. The next two sections talk about the results and 
discuss the main finding comparing the D.F. to Guanajuato. 
 
 
4.2. How and how much is social capital impacted by crime and 
corruption? 
 
4.2.1. Interpretation of the data 
“The simplest way to conduct a multisample path analysis is to estimate 
the model separately for each group and then compare the unstandardized 
solutions” (Kline 1998: 187)64. This is the procedure that was followed. Each 
factor loading obtained in the model represents the effect size between two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Once the model has been respecified based on empirical evidence we will use standardized 
coefficients. 
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variables in the model that have a causing link between them, They are easier to 
use because they are similar to regression coefficients65. Following is an 
example on how to read the numbers presented from here on and that determine 
how social capital and other relevant democratic attitudes are impacted by crime 
and corruption. If a relation between two variables in the model is said to have an 
effect size of 0.15 it should be understood that the dependent variable or caused 
variable is expected to have an increase of 0.15 standard deviations for every 
change of one full standard deviation in the independent or causing variable. If 
the effect size has a negative sign it means the opposite effect (Kline 1998: 120). 
As in a regression, the effect size is controlled by the other variables impacting 
the dependent variables that are included in the model. In order to evaluate the 
magnitude of the impact we will consider the following: small effect size if the 
value is lower than 0.10, medium if it s a value around 0.30 and large if it is 
greater than 0.50 (see Bollen 1989: 137). It is important to note that as a result of 
a large sample such as the one presented here, effect size between variables is 
expected to be highly significant but of very small magnitude (Kline 1998: 13). 
 
4.2.2. How is social capital impacted by crime, corruption and fear? 
 Figures 3.2 and 3.3 presented the hypothesized causal relations included 
in the model.  A total of 19 relational links were drawn in the model between the 
main causing variables (crime, corruption and fear) and the key independent 
variables that capture the concept of social capital (personal trust, institutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Standardized coefficients are equivalent to correlations and/or variance explained. For more 
information see Kline (1984) and Kenny (http://davidakenny.net/kenny.htm) 
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trust, reciprocity, formal and informal participation). Table 4.2 is a summary of 
these 19 hypothesized relations included in the original model before the 
respecifications. We need to remind that these are not all the links included in the 
model but only the ones that impact the cognitive or structural components of 
social capital. A total of thirty causal arrows are drawn in the model shown in 
figure 3.2 and we expect additional links once the significant impacts of the four 
demographic anchors are included in the respecifications. It is important to note 
that it was also hypothesized in the original model that fear would be caused by 
both experience and perceptions of crime. The exact same model was tested (i.e 
replicated) in both groups.  
Table 4.3 shows for both groups the regression estimates obtained in the original 
model.  This are consider direct effects between the variables. About half of the 
hypothesized causal relations hold when we run the original model: 10 out of 19 
in the D.F. and 9 in Guanajuato66. Before we discuss specific impacts between 
variables two important general findings need to be pointed out. The first one is 
the number of relations that have a statistically significant effect, in other word 
the number of hypothesis that is empirically confirmed by the data. The last two 
columns in Table 4.3 present an account of which relations were kept and which 
dropped in the respecification process. As the reader can see we have very 
similar patterns in both groups with the greatest variations found on experience 
and perceptions of crime. However as it is shown in the table fear negatively 
impacts most components of social capital and because both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Because new relational links are added in the first and second respecification, some of these 
kept links can be eliminated in the later (respecified) models. In the final model achieved after two 
respecifications ends up with nine of the original links in the D.F. and six in Guanajuato. 
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experience/perception of crime/corruption increases fear, indirect effects (through 
fear) can be found between crime/corruption and social capital. This total impact, 
which includes direct and indirect effects is discusses later in the chapter.  
 
 
 
The second relevant general finding is that not all effects (significant or not) in the 
model are in the expected direction. However in practically all cases these 
relations are not statistically significant. In the D.F. both experience and 
perceptions of crime present a significant impact in a direction opposite to the 
one expected. This is the case of the paths of experiences of crime to personal 
trust and perceptions to reciprocity and formal and informal participation. 
Additionally we see that in both groups experience with corruption increases 
institutional trust but in a non-significant way. The same happens with the relation 
between fear and formal participation but this relation is only statistically 
significant in Guanajuato. 
As the table shows experience of crime impacts reciprocity in Guanajuato and 
the effect of perceptions of crime on institutional trust is only confirmed in the 
D.F. Regarding experience with corruption we see that the hypothesized impacts 
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on the structural social capital are confirmed in both groups but the opposite 
happens for the impact on institutional trust. For perceptions of corruption we 
also see confirmation of impact on the cognitive variables in both group but only 
a small significant impact on formal participation in the D.F. Finally fear impacts 
three out of four expected variables in each group but it is not significant on 
formal participation in the D.F. nor on informal in Guanajuato. 
 
 
 
Before discussing the total effect (direct plus indirect effect) that crime, corruption 
and fear have on social capital, following is a brief description of the significant 
effects found in the final model (after two respecifications were conducted). Table 
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4.4 shows the unstandardized regressions weights of all variables in the model; it 
includes the first modification and second modification or final model for each 
group. Many things can be discussed from the table, which is equivalent to the 
data of twelve regression equations (one for each dependent variable listed in 
the second column). In the next section we will discuss the impact of 
crime/corruption on other democratic attitudes as well as how the demographic 
anchors shape the model. For now we continue the discussion of the impact of 
the context of crime/corruption on social capital. For easiness of identification of 
variables included in the measured concept of social capital are highlighted with 
a small gray square to their left. The table first shows the substantive dependent 
variables (crime, corruption and fear) and then the demographic anchors. In 
Table 4.3 we presented the variables that were dropped from the model because 
no empirical evidence was found in the data to support their hypothesized causal 
relation. We now turn our attention to causal relation that were not hypothesized 
but were added in the first or send respecification of the model. Added links are 
highlighted in bold in Table 4.4.  We remind the reader that links were added only 
if they made sense from a theoretical rationale and if they presented high 
modifications indexes that could lead to a significant causal link and/or improve 
the fitness of the model discuss earlier in the chapter. For the moment we will 
only discuss additional links from crime/corruption/fear to social capital.  
A link from crime experience to informal participation was added in both groups67 
and in Guanajuato an additional link from this causing variable to formal 
participation was included. Because it was hypothesized that perception of crime 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 In Guanajuato this link was non-significant and dropped in the final model. 
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and corruption would negatively impact all the five social capital variables (three 
cognitive and two structural) no additions links were possible. In the final model 
achieved through two respecifications we get confirmation for three of these link 
in the D.F. (the three cognitive) and only two in Guanajuato (institutional trust and 
reciprocity). An important link for its potential indirect effect was added from 
experience of crime to fear. It was hypothesized that fear would impact all social 
capital items except institutional trust; in final model the link from fear to formal 
participation is dropped and in Guanajuato the impact on personal trust is also 
eliminated. We turn now to the major findings based exclusively on direct effects 
found to be statistically significant in the final model (see Table 4.4.). 
Experience of crime has little direct effect in the D.F. impacting significantly only 
informal participation. In Guanajuato it has a negative and significant impact on 
reciprocity but a large and positive impact on formal participation. This is an 
energizing effect like the Marti or Sicilia reactions described in chapter II. An 
alternative or complementary way is to see it as in part as an increment of activity 
from formal organizations due to an increased concerned of the situation with 
crime and part as a “focus of attention” from these organizations to approach and 
focus on the issue of crime, as in the case of the organization found by Marti or 
the movement triggered by Sicilia’s actions. Whatever the case it seems that in 
many individuals the experience of crime serves as powerful detonator for action. 
Be it to abandon the city where they live to find a safer place or to stand up and 
fight, these experiences appear to be having a “last straw” effect and are 
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increasing the participation of individuals. We have yet to see if this is a long 
positive effect or only a momentary reaction from a cornered or wounded society.   
It was expected that the experience of crime would impact personal and 
institutional trust but these links are not found in the data as a direct effect.  
There was only one direct effect of perception of crime: negative impacts on 
institutional trust in the D.F. No other direct effects of perception of crime were 
found on either group, again something not expected. However perception of 
crime has a considerable impact on fear on both groups (0.328 and 0.342 
respectively) and experience of crime has a large impacts fear in the Guanajuato 
(0.914) but not in the D.F. Therefore significant indirect effects of crime, from 
either experience or perception, are found in both groups, which will be 
discussed later. 
Out of the four contextual variables (i.e. the two crime and two corruption 
indexes) the one with the biggest effect on social capital is perceptions of 
corruption. In the D.F. it negatively impacts the three components of the cognitive 
dimension of social capital with small effects size on personal trust and 
reciprocity and medium effect on institutional trust. In Guanajuato no effect was 
found on personal trust but the findings report similar small and medium impacts 
on reciprocity and institutional trust respectively. Under the argument that 
corruption is generally a situation were an institution is present it was expected 
that the largest effect would be found from perception of corruption to institutional 
trust. However it could be relevant to the quality and future of democracy in 
Mexico that the data show that perceived corruption is also impacting individual 
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trust and attitudes of reciprocity between individuals. It was hypothesized that 
perceptions of crime would impact the structural dimension of social capital but 
such causal relation wasn’t found in the data for neither group. For the 
experience of crime four causal relations were expected but none confirmed. 
However this variable has a significant impact on fear, which means that it 
indirectly can impact social capital. In both groups fear negatively impacts 
personal trust and reciprocity and in the D.F. it also has an effect on informal 
participation.  
We now turn to the total effect of crime/corruption/fear on social capital. The total 
effect results from the sum of the direct and indirect statistically significant effects 
(in this case thorough fear) between variables in the final model of interaction. 
The AMOS software used to run the SEM analysis produces calculates both 
effects so by adding them we can present the total effect between variables, 
which is reported in Table 4.5. All the numbers presented in the table are 
statistically significant standardized coefficients68 and represent the sum of the 
direct and indirect effect of each causal relation link in the final model. To discuss 
the result we will now turn our attention to the dependent variables, that is the 
dimensions of social capital found in the six first rows of each group in the table. 
The table also includes results for the three variables that do not form part of the 
social capital construct but are relevant democratic attitudes or correlates: human 
capital, civic engagement and satisfaction with democracy (last three rows of 
each group). Findings for these variables are discussed in the next section. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The numbers in Table 4.4 are unstandardized coefficients and thus different from the ones in 
this table. 
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The first major finding is that the three components of the cognitive dimension of 
social capital, personal and individual trust and reciprocity, are significantly 
impacted by both crime and corruption. Only in the D.F. we find no effect from 
experience of crime to any of the three components. Perceptions of crime and 
corruption, each impact the three components in the D.F. and two of the three in 
Guanajuato. Personal trust and reciprocity appear to be particularly hurt by the 
four contextual variables (i.e. experiences and perceptions of crime and 
corruption). All of these contextual variables impact personal trust in both groups 
with the exception of experience of crime in the D.F. and perceptions of 
corruption in Guanajuato.  We find a similar effect on reciprocity but in this case 
only experience of crime in the D.F. does not affect it. Results also suggest that 
in the D.F. perceptions are more important than experiences but they are equally 
powerful in Guanajuato. 
The second major finding is that we see very different patterns of affection of the 
structural dimension of social capital. In Guanajuato only formal participation is 
impacted by experience of crime and in direction opposite to the one expected 
(i.e. in a positive way). On the D.F. however, formal participation is not impacted 
by any of the four contextual variables but informal participation is affected by 
three of them. As in Guanajuato, there is a positive impact of experience of crime 
to this dependent but experience of corruption and perceptions of crime have as 
negative impact on this variable. Such dissimilar patterns may be attributed to the 
amount of crime and corruption found in each group. At the time of the surveys 
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the D.F. was a high crime/corruption context while the opposite was true for 
Guanajuato.  
The third relevant finding is the large effect that crime/corruption have on fear; 
this was expected and greatly contributes to the total effect (direct plus indirect) 
results of Table 4. 5. There are three important issues to be discussed about this 
relation. One hand there is the issue of the pattern: in both groups we find no 
effect from perceptions of corruption and fear but significant impacts of 
perceptions of crime and experience of corruption. We expected causal links 
from crime to fear but little or no effect from corruption to crime. It is very 
interesting and relevant that experiencing corruption, a variable that unfortunately 
is increasing, as we will see in the next chapter, makes individuals live with more 
fear. Experience of crime impacts fear only in Guanajuato. This may have to do 
with the size of the problem of victimization in the D.F.; this does not suggests 
that experience of crime does not impact fear but it probably means that we find 
little variations in individuals, because most individuals have had close 
experiences of crime (directly or through close relatives). In other words 
experience of crime in the D.F. in 2004 behaved less a variable and more as a 
constant.  
On another hand we have the issue of the size of the effect. As we see from the 
results comparatively speaking the context of crime/corruption has a greater 
impact on fear than on variables of social capital. This is crucial for two reasons: 
(a) it means that it has a greater impact on feelings (fear) than attitudes (trust) or 
behaviors (participation); and (b) strongly suggest that studies of how social 
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capital and other key democratic attitudes are being impacted by crime and 
corruption should be moderated (or at least control for) by a measurement of 
individual fear otherwise we may find unwanted results such as type II errors, 
spurious relations and even result showing wrong directionality. The third thing is 
the issue of how individual react differently to adverse context. Not all individuals 
that experience/perceive crime or corruption will become fearful. For example 
two people that experience the same car crash or that live together through the 
same robbery or crime do not react in the same way. While one may be greatly 
affected by the event and become fearful and distrustful of others while the other 
one may become angry/braver wanting to do something about it like actively 
participate in finding a solutions on combating these problems. It is very possible 
that the less the adverse the context in terms of crime the more fearful an 
individual becomes when experience crime. This is the case of a low crime 
environment such as Guanajuato 2005. However in high crime environments 
such as the D.F. people overcome fear, precisely out of surviving it through 
repeated and extended experiences, and become sort of immune to it. This may 
be similar to what happened to cities like Medellin in the early 90´s and partially 
explains why experience of crime detonates participation. Another aspect that 
need to be consider is how violent are the experienced crimes. The type of 
crimes and the degree of violence associated with them is very different in 
Colombia 1990, than in D.F. 2004, the U.S.A. after 9/11 or Monterrey violent 
murders in 2011. My data has no sufficient depth to incorporate variance by 
violence but this is something that should be explored in future research. 
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The fourth and last finding discussed from the results of Table 4.5. is how fear 
(last column) affects social capital. In both groups we see a negative impact on 
personal trust and reciprocity. We find no effect on institutional trust but we do 
see that stocks of cognitive social capital may diminish if levels of fear in a 
society increase. That personal trust and reciprocity, crucial relational attitudes, 
are affected in such way by the conditions of fear should be of great concern due 
to the power of perceptions. One of the largest effects found in the model is that 
perceptions of crime greatly impact fear. In an context like that of Mexico 2010-
2011, were a perceived environment of crime and public insecurity has greatly 
increased, as well as actual crime victimization and violent deaths, there is a real 
possibility that the stocks of personal trust and reciprocity in most areas of 
Mexico have and continue to be affected. Recent data on victimization and 
perceptions of crime and corruption is presented in the next chapter. 
We have been analyzing the result from specific to general. We first looked at the 
direct effects of each causal relation for both groups (Table 4.4); we then turned 
our attention to the total effect (the sum of direct and indirect effect found in 
Table 4.5) also in both groups. To conclude this section we now analyze a 
simpler model that we will call the context model. This model groups the four 
contextual variables into one single index to capture the effects of an adverse 
context of crime/corruption that includes both experiences and perceptions of 
individuals. We know from the lengthy discussion above about the specific 
results that the more complete/detailed models depict a series of complex 
interactions. However all the findings indicate that crime and corruption do 
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adversely impact social capital and this is clearly shown in this simpler context 
model. The model showing impact of context on social capital is shown in Figure 
4.1. 
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Table 4.6 shows the total effect (direct and indirect) of this nested hybrid model, 
in which the experience and perception of crime and corruption are grouped into 
a single unobserved latent variable called context69. 
Figure 4.1. Context model 
  
 
 
 
By doing so, I am able to show in a single number the effect of the context of 
crime and corruption on each of the components of social capital.  The impact of 
crime and corruption on the cognitive dimension of social capital is significant 
and moderately high in both groups.  We find practically the same pattern of the 
effect of context of crime and corruption on social capital in both groups although 
there are interesting differences in the magnitude of these effects. The three 
most important things reinforce the discussion we have had up to here and can 
be viewed as a summary of the major findings.  
• Crime and corruption adversely impact the cognitive dimension of social 
capital: people that experience or perceive a context charged with crime 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 It is a hybrid model because it includes both unobserved construct and observed variables or 
indexes. In this model “Context” is not an added index of the four contextual variables but rather a 
calculated unobserved construct that results form these variables. 
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and corruption are more likely to have lower levels of personal and 
institutional trust and reciprocity than those who don’t. 
• The impact of crime and corruption on the structural dimension of social 
capital appears to be dependent on the context with small effects in high 
crime/corruption contexts such as the D.F. and almost non-existent in low 
crime/corruption environments like Guanajuato.   
• Context of crime and corruption has a strong effect on fear in both groups 
but is significantly higher in Guanajuato were the problems are less wide 
spread and historically less common than in the D.F. This is of great 
importance because fear impacts both the cognitive and structural 
dimensions of social capital. 
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4.3. Additional findings: the impact of crime and corruption on democratic 
attitudes and differences by key demographic segments  
Up to here we have presented in detail the results that show the impact of 
crime and corruption on social capital. We first discussed the direct effect on all 
hypothesized and added (through respecifications) causal links followed by the 
total effect and finally presented a more parsimonious model called the context 
model. We now turn to two additional sets of results that are found in the data 
and that complement our understanding of the political cost of crime and 
corruption.  The first one is how human capital and other important democratic 
attitudes are being impacted by crime and corruption. The second set of results 
has to do with how the four demographic anchors of the model (i.e. gender, age, 
education and socio-economic level) impact the rest of the variables. For the 
former we will discuss the results presented in Table 4.5 and 4.6 and for the 
latter will use Table 4.4. 
 
4.3.1. The impact of crime and corruption on democratic attitudes 
In sum the context model discussed at the end of the previous section, 
tells us that: (a) crime and corruption have a small negative effect on human 
capital measured here partially as self-reported personal health; (b) medium to 
high negative impact on civic engagement a behavior measured by the activity 
index; and (c) a moderate negative impact on satisfaction with democracy. These 
findings hold for both groups (see Table 4.6). We find data on specific interaction 
between the four contextual items and these other democratic attitudes in Table 
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4.5. Here we see that perceptions and experience of corruption as well as 
perceptions of crime are negatively impacting human capital in the D.F. Fear also 
negatively impacts human capital with greater effect size. We find the same 
pattern in Guanajuato except that here there is no significant effect from 
perceptions of corruption. These findings speak of an additional and relevant 
political cost of crime and corruption as it is confirmed that they hurt an important 
component of human capital. 
We find an identical pattern of the impact of crime/corruption on civic 
engagement in both groups: experience and perceptions of crime as well 
experience of corruption and fear negatively impact civic engagement. The 
biggest impact comes from perceptions of crime and fear, more than double the 
impact of the two other variables. Finally we see that satisfaction with democracy 
is greatly impacted in Guanajuato --the four contextual variables plus fear have a 
negative impact on it—but we only see that perceptions of crime mildly impact it 
in the D.F. It is not clear why we see this dissimilar pattern and why there is a 
very little effect on democratic satisfaction in the group with higher 
crime/corruption. 
 
4.3.2. Differences by key demographic segments 
Table 4.4 shows regressions weights of all variables in the model by 
group.  Many things can be discussed from the table, which as it was already 
said, is equivalent to the data of twelve regression equations.  To illustrate the 
depth and richness of the data and how we can unpack many details of the 
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complex interaction contained in the model we will discuss the case of the impact 
of gender on informal participation: This will serve as an example of the 
potentially rich interpretation that can be produced from such SEM models. To 
conclude the chapter we will do a summary of the main effects of the 
demographic anchors.  
Gender related research on social capital shows that in the less developed world, 
women play a central role in the generational stocks of social capital (Molenaers 
2003).  The reason is very simple: these women do not work and stay at home in 
higher proportions than women in the developed world.  Thus they have a higher 
impact on the transmission of values (e.g. trust and reciprocity) and knowledge 
(e.g. interpretation of context) to future generations. Additionally they are in many 
instances ‘the motor’ behind all sorts of informal cooperative behavior, from 
sharing child-caring responsibilities to informal financial networks of support.  In 
places where these two assumptions hold (I believe this is the case of Mexico, 
especially in middle/low socio-economic stratus) women play a crucial role on the 
stocks of social capital, particular on future stocks.  The results of my model 
show that there is an inverse relation between gender (male) and informal 
participation; this confirms the second assumption.  Unfortunately results also 
show that women are more prone to become fearful and less active thus 
reducing civic engagement, remember we have shown that fear is one of the 
variables that in greater amount appears to adversely impact social capital.  As 
this example shows, the model can help qualify some complex relations; in this 
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case additional information to fine-tune the adverse effect of crime and corruption 
on future stocks of social capital in Mexico. 
The statistically significant effects of the demographic anchors are as follow. Age 
negatively impacts informal participation and human capital in both groups and 
experience of corruption and fear in Guanajuato. It is understandable and 
expected that younger individuals participate more, report better personal health 
and are less fearful than older individuals. However it was not expected that they 
would be less exposed to or participate in corruption; this however is a positive 
thing for democracy and it can signal a change in culture as younger individuals 
are less prone to be active in corrupt practices. Education has a positive impact 
on informal participation, human capital, experience and perceptions of crime in 
both groups and additionally an inverse impact on fear in the D.F. These all can 
be expected if we understand that education is highly correlated with income, 
hence it is understandable that the more educated the individual the more likely 
that s/he participates and the more well off s/he will repot better person health 
and be more concerned about crime and potentially report lower levels, perhaps 
more reasoned and/or informed, of fear. Socio-economic level has a significant 
effect on both formal and informal participation and on human capital but only in 
the D.F. However it shows no significant relation to perceptions of crime or fear 
on either group. In Guanajuato it also shows a moderate impact on experience 
with crime and low on perceptions of corruption. These effects were not 
necessarily expected but have been documented before. Finally we come back 
to the impact of gender.  Women report statistically significantly lower levels of 
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human capital and informal participation, but greater levels of fear and civic 
engagement than men for both the D.F. and Guanajuato. Additionally in 
Guanajuato they report lower levels of perceived corruption but higher perception 
of crime. 
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Chapter V: The magnitude of the problem today 
 
There can be no daily democracy without daily citizenship. 
 
Ralph Nader 
 
In the previous chapters I presented the theoretical relevance of the main 
research question and have empirically tested and accepted all working 
hypothesis. Are Mexicans that have greater perception and exposure to crime 
and corruption less likely to trust each other and participate actively in their 
communities? The answer is yes, and as the results have shown, in turn this may 
prove to have a significant impact on the quality of democracy and economic 
development. The data presented here is evidence that victims of 
crime/corruption and individuals who have greater perceptions of the magnitude 
of these problems live with greater fear, report worse personal health, report 
lower levels of personal and institutional trust, participate less and are less 
satisfied with democracy (see Table 4.6). 
There are four discussions in this final chapter. The first one presents aggregated 
and individual level data on crime and corruption in the last decade as a way of 
showing the magnitude of the problem in Mexico as well as its current trends. In 
the second section additional data at the hemispheric level on the impact of 
crime/corruption on social capital is presented; the discussion of the 
generalization of my findings is covered here. The third is a prospective 
discussion on the stock of social capital in the context of the findings of the 
previous chapter and the current crime/corruption data. The last section closes 
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with general concluding remarks, included here is the discussion of the 
implications for the quality of democracy in Mexico. 
 
5.1. The Magnitude of crime and corruption in Mexico in the new 
millennium 
The Conflict Barometer (CB) of the Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research has developed a four-category countries classification: non-
violent country, crisis country, country with limited war and country with war70.  
Mexico had been a non-violent country until 2007 when the CB classified it as a 
country with a sever crisis; however starting in 2010, and for the last three years, 
Mexico has been considered a war country. This is how bad things have gotten 
in terms of crime and violence in Mexico.  
Many expected that the country’s executions would significantly decrease with 
the presidency of Peña Nieto arrival of the return of the PRI to government but 
this has not been the case. A total of 2,338 executions were reported in the last 
100 days of president Calderon who’s government started the “war on crime” by 
directly confronting the drug cartels with the use of the army; in the first 100 days 
of the new government this number slightly increase to 2,35171. An average of 
almost 800 deaths (almost 30 daily) by execution is a ridiculously high figure and 
by far the most salient news topic. Even though the fight against crime is 
concentrated geographically, the phenomenon has permeated perceptions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For more information on the reports with results and classification criteria consult the Institute’s 
web site at: http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html 
71 Source: Ejecutometro by Reforma newspaper (http://gruporeforma.reforma.com). 
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across the country. This has been captured in public opinion polls and 
victimization surveys. 
According to the Consulta Mitofski poll series, perceptions regarding the main 
problem facing the country are concentrated in economic and security issues 
with a recent change in the incidence of each. The data is presented in Figure 
5.1 and shows that the percentage of Mexican adults that responded that 
security is the main problem facing the country was about on fifth to one third of 
the population from 2006 to 2009; however we see an inflection point starting in 
early 2010 with a peak in 201172. The numbers show that since 2011 security is 
the main concern for roughly half of the adult population. Perceptions have 
clearly been impacted and unfortunately it is not just a media effect or social 
paranoia.  There is evidence that the number of victims has been on the raise 
lately. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Information can be found at: http://consulta.mx/web/ 
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According to the Americas Barometer (AB) of the LAPOP project the number of 
households that report having one or more members that have been victims of 
crime in the last twelve months has doubled from 17.3% in 2004 to 33.7% in 
201273. These numbers are confirmed by the victimization surveys conducted by 
the census bureau INEGI. The main figures of the 2012 National victimization 
and perceptions about public security survey (ENVIPE) are presented in Table 
5.1.  As the numbers show two thirds of the population perceive a problem with 
security and one third has been victimized recently; the total number of victims 
and crimes is alarming with more than 22 million crime incidents per year. While 
most of these crimes are simple street robberies (28.9%) other types of crime like 
extortions (19.6%), vehicle thefts (14.0%), frauds (8.6%) or threats (7.8%) are 
also significant. The bottom line is that a common Mexican adult has a very high 
probability of being a victim of crime on any given year and most likely will 
perceive a highly insecure environment for her/him. 
 
Table 5.1: Selected figures of the 2012 ENVIPE conducted by INEGI 
 
Indicators 
 
Households with victims 2011 (%) 
 
30.6 
Total number of victims of 18 years or older in 2011 18,675,004 
Total number of crimes in 2011 22,389,492 
Percentage of respondents that perceive insecurity (%) 66.6 
  
Source: ENVIPE 2012. 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/Proyectos/Encuestas/Hogares/regulares/envipe/
envipe2012/default.aspx 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 All data for the Americas Barometer can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ 
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Regarding corruption we also find alarming data both at the aggregate and 
individual level. The Americas Barometer shows that consistently since 2004, a 
fifth to a quarter of the adult population reports that policemen asked her/him for 
a bribe in the last year; bribes asked by public officials are reported at around 
10% every year and similar percentages are found in five other social relations 
measured in the survey. The total victimization by corruption reported by the AB 
series has been consistently between 30% and 40% of the adult population from 
2004 to 2012. According to this the AB the percentage of adults that believe that 
corruption if very generalized phenomenon is about 45% with an additional 35% 
thinking it is somewhat generalized. The Mexican chapter of Transparency 
International conducts a bi-annual survey on the topic called the ENCBG. This is 
a summary of their 2010 survey results74: 
 
 [In the 2010 survey] Mexican households reported more than 200 million 
acts of corruption […] in 10.3 out every 100 times that a private or public 
service was provided the households reported giving a bribe. The 
economic cost of corruption surpassed 32 thousand million pesos, an 
increment from 2007 of 5 thousand millions […] Mexico increased from 
197 millions corruption acts in 2007 to 210 millions in 2010 and increased 
in the average cost per act from $138 pesos to $165 pesos. […] These 
acts of corruption represent an additional tax equivalent to 14% of the total 
income of the average household and of 33% of households with income 
of one minimum wage or less. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For more information see: http://www.tm.org.mx/indice-nacional-de-corrupcion-y-buen-
gobierno-primera-serie-historica-de-corrupcion-en-mexico/ 
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Aggregated data complements the magnitude of the problem:  Mexico is ranked 
105 out of 176 countries in the 2012 Corruption Perception Index of 
Transparency International receiving 34 points in a 100 points scale; a similar 
grade that countries such as Algeria, Armenia, Bolivia, Gambia, Kosovo, Mali 
and the Philippines. In the G20 countries Mexico is listed as number 18 only 
surpassed by Indonesia and Russia; in the group of the OECD countries it 
occupies the last place in the perceived levels of public sector corruption. As with 
crime/insecurity these are very high figures for both the incidence and the 
perceptions about corruption in Mexico. The common Mexican adult has a very 
high probability of being a victim of corruption on any given year and most likely 
will perceive a highly corrupt environment.  
As it was mentioned above, there are not only social and political impacts of this 
reality --as shown in the models of the previous chapter-- but also economic 
ones. According to INEGI, in 2011 the estimated total cost as a direct 
consequence of crime and insecurity is equivalent to 1.38% of Mexico’s GDP. 
The numbers from the latest ENCGB represent similar high cost and the impact 
on other sectors of the economy is being hard felt. In tourism for example, 
Mexico is classified 121 out of 140 countries in the “security and risk” indicator of 
the 2013 Travel and Tourism Competitiveness index of the World Economic 
Forum75. For the first time in many years, Mexico may loss its place among the 
world’s top-10 tourist destinations. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 For more information see: http://www.weforum.org/issues/travel-and-tourism-competitiveness 
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5.2. Can we generalize the findings? 
A very relevant discussion has to do with the generalization of the 
findings: is this pattern observed only in Mexico or can we generalize the findings 
to other countries in the hemisphere? I try to answer to answer this question 
using the Americas Barometer 2012 survey, which allows analyzing and 
comparing individuals from 26 countries of the western hemisphere. Comparable 
key indicators of my research are use in the AB with the exact same wording in 
all countries. I say comparable because unlike my model that relies on multi-item 
construct measurements of variables, the AB includes single item indicators for 
most of these. It is a possibility that such differences in the research design can 
impact the results. However the AB is perfect for my purpose because it includes 
indicators of both cognitive and structural social capital and also includes both 
perception and experiential indictors of crime and corruption.  
To test if crime and corruption have an impact on social capital I will run two 
regression models, one for each dimension of social capital. The fact that the 
analysis of chapter IV relies on structural equation models constitutes another 
important difference when comparing results. In the first model we have a single 
item measure of interpersonal trust as the dependent variable and in the second 
a multi-item of participation at the community level. In each model we have nine 
predictors: experience and perceptions of crime and corruption plus five key 
demographic variables. Crime victimization is captured as a direct question to 
see if the respondent was a victim of crime in the last twelve-month period. 
Corruption victimization is also a single indicator but is constructed from a list of 
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several situations where the respondent may have been a victim of corruption in 
the same period. The two perception questions are single item four-scale 
questions of the problem. The mathematical expression of each model is 
presented below: 
Interpersonal trust = ⨍ (C, CrV, PI, CoV, PC, G, SP, Edu, Age, SEL) 
Community participation = ⨍ (C, CrV, PI, CoV, PC, G, SP, Edu, Age, SEL) 
   where 
C  = constant 
CrV  = crime victimization 
PI  = perception of insecurity 
CoV  = corruption victimization 
PC  = perception of corruption 
G  = gender of the respondent (female) 
SP  = size of place of residence (form small rural to capital city) 
Edu  = education level 
Age  = age of the respondent 
SEL  = socio economic level (quintals of wealth) 
 
I test each model at the hemispheric level using the 39 thousand interviews 
included in the 2012 AB survey to see if there is evidence, at the individual level, 
that crime/corruption are determinants of the dimensions/components of social 
capital. The beta coefficients and significance of variables for each model is 
presented in Table 5.2; the results are shown graphically in Figure 5.2. No 
anomalies were detected when assessing the adjustment of the models and 
distribution of residuals. 
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The results at the hemispheric level are very interesting. Regarding the cognitive 
dimension, we observe that all variables in the model are statistically significant 
predictors of interpersonal trust and all but perception of corruption impact in the 
expected direction. Victims of crime and corruption and those with high 
perceptions of insecurity have lower levels of interpersonal trust than non-victims. 
This is supporting evidence of the negative impact of crime/corruption on trust. 
We also observe that men and people living in smaller areas have greater 
interpersonal trust in other than women and people of larger urban centers; 
greater education level, older age of the respondent and greater wealth 
correspond to larger interpersonal trust.  
Regarding the structural dimension we observe a very different pattern that in 
part contradicts the findings of the SEM model of chapter IV. On one hand we 
see that perceptions do not have a significant impact on participation at the 
community level and on the other the crime/corruption experimental indicators 
have a significant impact but in the opposite direction. The AB data supports the 
claim of an “energizing” effect of crime/corruption on the structural dimension of 
social capital, which contradicts some of my research hypothesis. 
The model was also tested with Mexico respondents only for two reasons. First 
to show that there are differences by country and to have a potentially closer 
comparison with the results of the ad-hoc survey results of the previous chapters. 
The complete results are reported in Annex 4. Using the same regression with 
2012 AB data for Mexico we find that the strongest predictor of interpersonal trust 
is perception of insecurity and that neither perceptions of corruption or 
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crime/corruption victimization are significant. Of the demographic variables only 
wealth has a direct and significant relation on interpersonal trust. For community 
participation only experiential corruption has a significant and energizing effect. 
Gender, age, and place of residence are also statistically significant.  
 
 
Table 5.2. Standardized coefficients for the hemispheric regression models 
of the cognitive and structural dimensions of social capital 
 
 
 
Predictor 
 Cognitive 
Dimension 
 
Int. Trust 
 
Structural 
Dimension 
 
Participation 
Crime Victimization  -0.38**  .033** 
Perception of Insecurity  -.282**  -.001 
Perceptions of corruption  .016**  -.005 
Corruption Victimization  -.054**  .138** 
Gender (women)  -.029**  .153** 
Size of place of residence  -.073**  -.101** 
Education level  .031**  -.020** 
Age  .069**  .067** 
Quintiles of wealth  .066**  .025** 
     
Source: Americas Barometer 2012 by the LAPOP project of the University of 
Vanderbilt (N = 39,000 interviews) 
** Significance at .05 level  
 
 
The AB data permits to explore the 26 countries individually but such effort is 
beyond the scope of my research. Suffice to know that, as expected, different 
patterns emerge when we change the level of analysis from hemisphere to 
country.  
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Figure 5.2. Graphic representation of hemispheric regression models 
Determinants of Participation at the community level 
 
Determinants of Interpersonal Trust  
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I believe that the main source of the apparent contradictory or non-significant 
findings has to do with the research design and the analytical tools. This will be 
discussed in the last section of the chapter as part of the research conclusion. 
However what is of most importance is the fact that it is clear, as the hemispheric 
data show, that crime, corruption and social capital are causally related in 
significant ways and that additional analysis to better understands this important 
and potentially complex relation is needed. 
 
5.3. Assessing the future of stocks of Social Capital in Mexico 
It is hard to have a prospective assessment of social capital in Mexico due 
to the fact that different determining and opposite forces coexist in the first have 
of the second decade of the new millennium. The recently inaugurated 
government of Peña Nieto has achieved what its two predecessors could not: 
political consensus. The Pact for Mexico, an agreement between the three big 
political parties has been successful in agreeing and getting approval for three 
key structural reforms: labor, education and telecommunications and it is hoped 
that it can produce similar results for the energy sector and fiscal reform. It has 
also pushed for a National Crusade against hunger. In economic terms Mexico 
has significant and large international reserves that amount to a total of 165,675 
millions of dollars76; there has been a healthy inflow of direct foreign investment 
and Mexico is being treaty as a “new economic tiger”77. Following the process of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See: http://eleconomista.com.mx/taxonomy/term/899 
77 See: http://www.economia.gob.mx/comunidad-negocios/competitividad-normatividad/inversion-
extranjera-directa/estadistica-oficial-de-ied-en-mexico. And: 
http://www.cnnexpansion.com/economia/2013/01/31/mexico-el-nuevo-tigre-economico 
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democratic transition that started in the late 60´s and early 70´s the number of 
non-for-profit and non-government associations continues to growth (Aguayo and 
Peña 2012). 
Unfortunately the figures for crime and corruption are not encouraging. The 
number of executions in the fight against organized crime as well as the personal 
victimization figures are quite high and stable or slightly increasing. Even tough 
the new government plans to create a new anti-corruption office, in Mexico 
“corruption presents a systemic and institutional character that implies the 
existence of a very complex network of interests in which private and publics 
actors of all sectors and government levels participate” (Cejudo and Lopez 2013, 
my translation). Both problems, as the quote suggest, seem to be structural and 
will be very hard to resolve or improve. 
My estimation is that while improved economic and political contexts will continue 
to push for an organized society and participation, many individuals directly hurt 
by crime/corruption or perceiving themselves to be threatened by these 
problems, will slowly turn inwards. In the short and medium term, trust in friends 
and family will increase will while trust in “others” will decrease. Participation and 
closer, more familiar and safer situations such as at the community level, will also 
slightly and momentarily increase as a reaction to an adverse and increasingly 
perceived violent environment. In the longer run and if the crime situations start 
be resolved and corruption decrease, we will see a detonation of both cognitive 
and social capital coinciding with the continuation of organized civil society. 
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5.5. Concluding remarks 
 I started with a general research question: How and to what degree is 
social capital (and democracy) in Mexico being impacted by crime and 
corruption? Due to the complex nature of the question six specific hypotheses 
were presented and later tested empirically. Operationalisation of the research 
was a key concern and four crucial aspects were considered as a way of 
contributing to the scholarly literature.  
The first one was to explore crime and corruption, both at the perceived and 
experiential problem as significant determinants of social capital. In some models 
these were treated as separate indicators to be controlled by each other but also 
in more parsimonious models they were treated as a single context of adversity 
to test for potentially larger and total effects on our key independent variables. 
The second contribution was to include in the analysis an integral, not partial, 
measure of social capital with several indicators for each of the two-dimension 
and three-components of the phenomenon. The model included interpersonal 
trust, institutional trust, reciprocity, and formal and informal participation. Each of 
these indicators was treated as non-directly observable and/or referential 
phenomenon that needed to be measure using multi-item constructs and each of 
these was validate using confirmatory factor analysis. This constitutes the third 
contribution. Finally and due to the complex nature of the hypothesis 
measurement model, the forth contribution is the analysis of data using a 
Structural Equation Model that allows for multiple layers of causation and the use 
of important intervening variables such as fear.  
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I am convinced that such a robust research design produces better inferences of 
such a complex model of interaction between social phenomena as the one 
tested by my hypothesis. My results were contrasted by other findings in the 
literature (chapter II) as well as additional models using alternate data and 
alternate methods of analysis in this second section of this chapter. I believe that 
the main source of contradictory or non-significant findings, in this specific field of 
research, has to do with the research design and the analytical tools. 
Phenomena covered by humanities and social sciences like in this case are 
usually large and complex. I am convinced that structural equations models are 
better tools to try to synthesize and model these realities. It is also clear that 
when we are working with variables that cannot be observed directly we need to 
rely on multi item measurements and validate these by the use of confirmatory 
(not exploratory) factor analysis. Political science should consider these two 
observations for the generation of knowledge in its field.  If we don’t, we increase 
the risk of committing type I or type II errors. 
The literature reviewed in the second chapter was used to come up with a non-
normative straightforward and integral definition of social capital that was later 
efficiently operationalise to capture the two dimensions and three components of 
social capital. It also provided the arguments to justify the causal relation 
between the main concepts of my research model identifying that alternate or 
recursive causation was also found in the scholarly research. Finally it provided 
enough evidence of the positive link between social capital and democracy and 
development to frame the theoretical and practical relevance of the findings. The 
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model, supported by the literature, can be summarized as follows: 
crime/corruption have direct and indirect effects of both the cognitive and 
structural dimensions of social capital as well as on human capital and other 
democratic attitudes. It is in this hypothesis causation, later supported empirically 
by ad-hoc research, that I provide evidence of the negative impact that 
crime/corruption have on democracy and development. 
Individuals that have been victims of crime or corruption or those who have 
greater perceptions of the magnitude and adverse effects of such problems, are 
less likely to trust individuals or institutions, to cooperate with others and to 
participate in formal/informal social organizations. Additionally they report lower 
levels of personal health and lower satisfaction with democracy. In sum, it can be 
concluded that crime/corruption deteriorate social capital and have an adverse 
effect on social structure; in turn these effects have an impact on the quality of 
democracy. Of great concern should be the fact that the figures in Mexico for 
crime and corruption are alarmingly high. If trends continue as they are or if the 
numbers hold at least 1 out of every 3 adult will be a victim of crime or corruption 
and the large majority (two thirds or more) will perceive that these problems are 
real and a close concern to them and/or live with some level of fear. This is 
clearly nor desirable nor healthy for any given society. This has had clear 
economically implications for individuals and the country as a whole and my 
research shows that the political cost are likely to also be significant. 
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Just yesterday my two daughters experienced first hand the undesirable situation 
I have described throughout the chapters. It was a typical Sunday afternoon 
when we decide to go out for ice cream.  We like to go out to a place that serves 
yogurt ice cream with self-served toppings. When we were getting to the parking 
lot we noticed two policemen getting out their patrol car and walking towards the 
ice cream parlor. When we got there a visible upset women was standing outside 
the door of the establishment, she told us that the place was closed because it 
had just been robbed. Inside the store, the policemen were talking to the families 
that had the misfortune to witness the robbery and had been themselves robbed. 
Upon the news received by the lady, my daughters twelve and thirteen years of 
age, instinctively reached to each other to hold hands and then to me to ask to 
quickly get away from there. They were clearly alarmed. If we had come ten 
minutes earlier, we would have been victims instead of witnesses. On our way 
back home they could not stooped discussing the event they have just 
experienced. I tried to calm them. The discussion included several topics from 
the harsh reality of our city to the potential risk they now know they are exposed 
too. It is hard to know how this specific event will impact our future behavior; it is 
clear that they, and I, will be much more concerned and aware about the 
conditions and safety of our close environment. I am glad that my daughters had 
this experience; it will be part of their life lessons and will better prepare them for 
the real world. It is now important to find ways to achieve a safer environment for 
them, with them contributing, and to make sure this isolated event does not 
disproportionally defines their future perceptions and behaviors.  
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Annex 1: Transformation of items by construct 	  
Item Variable name Question Wording Recoded Values 
(Original code on questionnaire) 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS ANCHORS 
  
SEX Gender (Female) Gender (MARK WITHOUT ASKING) O (1) = male / 1 (2) = female 
AGE Age Could you tell me what is your age? 18 to 90 years 
EDU Education What is the last year of school you 
completed? 
0 = no education to 10 = graduate studies 
SEL Socio economic level Approximately, how many light bulbs do you 
have at home? 
0 = cero to 50 = light bulbs / Mean (99 No 
response) 
    
 
(1) INSTITUTIONAL TRUST (IT) 
  
IT1 Church 
IT2 Army 
IT3 Mass media (TV) 
IT4 Political Parties 
IT5 Big business 
IT6 Federal government 
IT7 Congress 
IT8 Public officials 
IT9 Judges b 
IT10 Police 
I am going to read to you a list of 
organizations.  For each please tell me how 
much trust do you have in them: a lot of 
trust, some, little or no trust at all? 
4 (1) = a lot / 3 (2) = some / 1 (3) = little / 
0 (4) nothing / 2 (9) Intermediate 
    
(2) INTERPERSONAL TRUST (PT)   
PT1 People in my 
neighborhood 
PT2 Clerks of stores where I 
shop 
PT3 People on the street 
PT4 Family members 
For each group of people tell me if you have 
a lot of trust in them, some trust, little trust 
or not trust at all? 
4 (1) = a lot / 3 (2) = some / 1 (3) = little / 
0 (4) nothing / 2 (9) Intermediate 
PT5 Generalized trust (most 
people can be trusted) 
In general terms, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can never 
be too careful when dealing with someone? 
3 (1) = most people can be trusted / 1 (2) 
= you can not be too careful / 2 (9) = 
Intermediate 
   
(3) RECIPROCITY (RC)   
RC1 Most people help (each) 
others 
In general terms, would you say that most 
people frequently help each other or almost 
always look out only for themselves? 
3 (1) = help each other / 1 (2) = help 
themselves / 2 (9) = Intermediate 
RC2 When in need, neighbors 
have helped me 
Do you agree of disagree with the following:  
When in need, neighbors have helped me? 
RC3 Helping others I help 
myself 
Do you agree of disagree with the following:  
Helping others I help myself 
5 (1) = agree / 3 (2, 9) neither / 1 (3) 
disagree 
   
(4) FORMAL PARTICIPATION (FP)   
FP1 Neighborhood association 
FP2 Related to education (e.g. 
PTA) 
FP3 Credit union/cooperative  
FP4 Political party 
FP5 Sports team/club 
FP6 Cultural club/association 
FP7 Church group 
FP8 NOG’s or private 
assistance organization 
I am going to read to you a list of 
organizations, for each please tell me if you 
are an active member, a member but not 
active, was once a member o never have 
been a member. 
4 (1) = active member / 3 (2) = passive 
member/ 1 (3) = was a member / 0 (4) 
never has been member / 2 (9) 
Intermediate 
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Item Variable name Question Wording Recoded Values 
(Original code on questionnaire) 
(5) INFORMAL PARTICIPATION (FP)   
IP1 Time spent with friend 
IP2 Time spent with 
colleagues outside work 
For each activity please tell me if its 
something you do every week, every other 
week, once a month, few times a year or 
never do it? 
4 (1) = every week-every other week / 3 
(2) =  once a month / 2 (3) = few times a 
year / 1 (4) = never / 2.5 (9) Intermediate 
    
(6) SATISFACTION WITH 
DEMOCRACY (D) 
  
D3 Satisfaction with 
democracy 
In general would you say that you are very 
satisfied with democracy, somewhat 
satisfied, little satisfied or not satisfied at all? 
4 (1) = very satisfied / 3 (2) = somewhat  
satisfied / 2 (3) = little  satisfied / 1 (4) not  
satisfied at all / 2.5 (9) = Intermediate 
 
 
  
(7) CIVIC ENGAGEMENT – LESS 
ACTIVE (LA) 
  
LA1 Visit friend/family 
LA2 Go out at night 
LA3 Go out early in the 
morning 
LA4 Use taxis 
LA5 Use public transportation 
Please tell me if you have stop doing the 
following for fear of being a victim of an 
assault. 
1 = yes / 0 (2, 9) = no 
    
(8) HEALTH / HUMAN CAPITAL   
HC1 Frequent headaches 
HC2 Easily get scare 
HC3 Feel nervous frequently 
HC4 Difficult performing daily 
activities 
HC5 Feel tired most of the time 
HC6 Self reported state of 
personal health 
Please tell me if you have experience the 
following during the past four weeks ... 
0 (1) = Yes / 3 (2) = No / 3 (9) 
Intermediate 
    
(9) CRIME CONTEXT - EXPERIENCE 
(CRE) 
  
CR1 Victim anytime during life During your lifetime, have you ever been a 
victim of a crime in city/state? 
1 (1) = Yes / 0 (2, 9) = No 
CR2 How many times victim 
past year 
And during the past twelve months how 
many times have you personally been a 
victim of a crime incity/state? 
0 (1, 9) = No / 1 (2) = Once / 2 (3) = Twice 
/ 3 (4) = three or more 
CR3 Victim other household 
member past year 
With out counting you, has any other person 
living in this home has been a victim of a 
crime during the past twelve months? 
CR4 Victim other close relative 
past year 
With out counting the persons living in this 
home, has a close relative been a victim of 
a crime during the last twelve months? 
1 (1) = Yes / 0 (2, 9) = No 
   
(10) CRIME CONTEXT - PERCEPTION 
(CRP) 
  
CR5 Risk of being a victim on 
the future 
In your opinion, how much risk do you run of 
being a victim of a crime: a lot, some, little 
or none?  
5 (1) = a lot / 4 (2) = some  / 2 (3) = little / 
1 (4) none / 3 (9) = intermediate 
CR6 How grave is the problem 
of public safety in city/state 
b 
How grave do you consider the problem of 
public safety in city/state? 
5 (1) = very  grave / 4 (2) = somewhat  
grave  / 2 (3) = little / 1 (4) not  grave at all 
/ 3 (9) = intermediate 
CR7 Possibility of ending with 
problem of public safety in 
city/state 
In your opinion how possible is to end with 
the problem of public safety in city/state? 
1 = very  possible / 2 = somewhat   
possible / 3 = little / 4 not   possible at all / 
2.5 (9) = intermediate 
CR8 In one year public safety in 
city/state will be better or 
worse 
A year from now do you think that the 
problem of public safety would be greater, 
the same or smaller? 
5 (1) = greater / 1 (2) = smaller / 3 (3, 9)  
= same 
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Item Variable name Question Wording Recoded Values 
(Original code on questionnaire) 
CR9 How threatened by local 
crime and violence 
How threatened by local crime and violence 
do you and your family feel? 
5 (1) = very  threatened / 4 (2) = 
somewhat   threatened / 2 (3) = little / 1 
(4) not   threatened at all / 3 (9) = 
intermediate 
    
 
(11) FEAR – PERSONAL SAFETY 
  
F1 At Home 
F2 At Work 
F3 In the Street 
F4 In a Public place (market) 
F5 Driving / public 
transportation 
When you are in ..., how do you feel: 
completely safe, somewhat safe, somewhat 
unsafe or completely unsafe? 
1 = completely safe / 2  = somewhat safe 
/ 4 (3) = somewhat unsafe / 5 (4)  = 
completely unsafe / 3 (9) = Intermediate 
   
(12) CORRUPTION – EXPERIENCE 
(COE) 
  
CO4 Bribe (mordida) anytime 
during life 
During your lifetime, have you ever had to 
give a bribe to obtain a product/service in 
city/state? 
1 (1) = Yes / 0 (2, 9) = No 
CO5 Bribe (mordida) past six 
months 
And during the past six months have you 
ever had to give a bribe to obtain a 
product/service in city/state? 
1 (1) = Yes / 0 (2, 9) = No 
CO6 Frequency bribes transit 
agents 
CO7 Frequency bribes avoid 
red tape 
CO8 Frequency bribes obtain 
permits 
In your community how common is to bribe 
..., answer using a scale from 0 to 10 where 
0 means not common at all and 10 means 
very common? 
0 to 10 / 5 (99) 
 
(13) CORRUPTION – PERCEPTION 
(COP) 
  
CO1 How grave is the problem 
of corruption in city/state 
How grave do you consider the problem of 
corruption in city/state? 
5 (1) = very  grave / 4 (2) = somewhat  
grave  / 2 (3) = little / 1 (4) not  grave at all 
/ 3 (9) = intermediate 
CO2 Possibility of ending with 
problem of corruption in 
city/state 
In your opinion how possible is to end with 
the problem of corruption in city/state? 
1 = very  possible / 2 = somewhat   
possible / 3 = little / 4 not   possible at all / 
2.5 (9) = intermediate 
CO3 In one year corruption in 
city/state will be better or 
worse 
A year from now do you think that the 
problem of corruption would be greater, the 
same or smaller? 
5 (1) = greater / 1 (2) = smaller / 3 (3, 9)  
= same 
CO9 Most Mexicans are honest 
or corrupt 
In you opinion would you say that most 
Mexicans re hones or corrupt? 
1 = honest / 5 (2) = corrupt / 3 (3, 9) 
neither 
CO10 Clean-corrupt self-
placement 
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means 
very corrupt and 10 very clean, how do you 
considered yourself? 
Inverse of scale 
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Annex 2: Confirmatory factor analysis: group comparison of 
Item factor loading and reliability by construct 
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Annex 3. Model respecifications by group	  
 
+ Respecifications D.F. 
 	  
• Respecification 1: correlated errors for the following pair of observed 
errors: e10-e11, e11-e12, and e12-e13.   
 
Causal link on the following variables: age  ForP, Edu  InfP, 
Edu  Health, Gender  Health, SEL  InfP, SEL   
Health, Gender  InfP, ExpCrime   InfP, Age  Health, and 
ExpCorr   Fear. 
 
• Respecification 2: correlated errors for the following pair of observed 
errors/variables:  e1-e4, e9-e10, Gender – Edu, e8-e11, e9-e14, 
and e8-e10.   
 
Causal link on the following variables: Edu  ExpCrime,  
Gender  LessActv, Edu  PerCrime, Gender  Fear,  
Edu  Fear, SEL  ForP, and ExpCrime   LeassActv. 
 
 
+ Respecifications Guanajuato 
 	  
• Respecification 1: correlated errors for the following pair of observed 
errors: e11-e12, e10-e11, e2-e4, e1-e4, e12-e13, and e10-e13.  
 
Causal link on the following variables: Gender  InfP,  
Edu  Health, Age  Health, Age  InfP, Gender  Health,  
Edu  InfP, SEL  Helath, Edu  ExpCrime, Edu  PerCrime, 
ExpCrime   ForP, Age  ExpCorr, ExpCrime   Health,  
ExpCorr   Fear, SEL  ExpCorr, Gender  LessActv, and 
ExpCrime   InfP. 
 
• Respecification 2: correlated errors for the following pair of observed 
errors/variables: e9-e14, e10-e12, e8-e9, and Gender – Edu.   
 
Causal link on the following variables: ExpCorr   Fear,  
ExpCrime   LeassActv, Age  Fear, Gender  PerCrime,  
SEL  PerCorr, and Gender  PerCorr. 	  	  
Model from were specifications were conducted is shown in next page. 
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Annex 3 (continued)  
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Annex 4. Regression results for Mexico using the Americas 
Barometer 2012 data for the cognitive and structural dimension 
of social capital	  
 
+ Regression model for Interpersonal trust 	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+ Regression model for community participation 	  
	  
